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ABSTRACT 
The Muslim Brotherhood has played a significant role in the history of the Middle 
East in the twentieth century. The organization was founded on religious fundamentalist 
principals striving to ensure that Islam would remain the cornerstone of Middle Eastern 
society. Yet the social and political events of the twentieth century ensured that the 
Muslim Brotherhood had very different experiences in different countries. In Egypt they 
faced repression, imprisonment and often violent confrontation with the government. 
This situation in turn led to an escalation of the Brotherhood's tactics and a radicalization 
of the organization. In Jordan the Brotherhood achieved a symbiotic relationship with the 
monarchy, exchanging support for legitimacy. This situation led to stability, continued 
moderation in the organization's platform and an increased influence over Jordanian 
society. A lesson that can be learned from comparing the Muslim Brotherhoods ' 
experiences in Egypt and Jordan is that allowing moderate fundamentalist organizations a 
limited role in society with access to the public is a more effective means of ensuring 
peace and stability than attempting to suppress the fundamentalist organizations. 
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PREFACE 
Since the first appearance of 'political Islam' on the world stage in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, journalists and others have described the phenomenon using terms such as 
'fundamentalist ' , ' radical ' and 'extremist ' more or less interchangeably. To complicate 
matters further, Musl im scholars use a different vocabulary to describe the same thing. 
For example, an Arab scholar would describe the Musl im Brotherhood as a radical 
organization or an extremist religious group but not a fundamentalist organization since 
fundamentalism is a Western concept. 1 An Arab scholar might refer to the original 
Musl im Brotherhood as a salqfi movement, thus giving a very clear and nuanced 
definition in Arabic, which a Western scholar may translate as extreme fundamentalism. 
Therefore, in the face of definition and translation problems it is necessary to define a 
number of the terms that will be used throughout. 
For the purposes of this thesis, ' fundamentalism' will be defined as a wide-
ranging movement or tendency which aims to purge Islam of the various modifications it 
has endured over the centuries and return it to what it considers to be the original 
principles of early Islam. This can include the Salaflyya movement, which seeks to 
return to the ways and teachings of the Prophet and his companions (the 'pious 
generation' , al-salaf al-saliti) avoiding the accumulations of later generations, and 
1
 Abdel Azim Ramadan, "Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt," in Martin E. Marty and Scott Appleby 
(eds.), Fundamentalism and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 152. 
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purportedly not deviating from the Qur 'an and the Sunna. However, it can also refer to 
those who wish to strip away the more recent excesses of the Muslim religion in order to 
find a way to reconcile the core principles of Islam with the modern world. The Musl im 
Brotherhood is a fundamentalist organization founded on this second principle. 
'Radicalization' will be used in the sense of embracing violent revolutionary tactics. 
'Ext remism' will refer to those who radicalize and adopt violent revolution as the policy 
of their organization. Other less frequently used words will be defined in the body of the 
text. 
This thesis will be divided into three sections. First, I will examine the historic 
evolution of Islamic fundamentalist ideology and the jurists who have shaped the course 
of modern fundamentalist thought. Second, I will outline the historic experiences of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and its relationship to the state in both Egypt and Jordan. I will 
conclude with an analysis of the distinctly different approaches that the Egyptian and 
Jordanian governments have employed in their relations with the Brotherhood and 
attempt to recommend what I hope might be an effective strategy for secular states to 
employ in their relations with Islamic fundamentalist organizations. 
Finally, while discussing the premise for this thesis with several colleagues I have 
encountered skepticism and sometimes even outright hostility to the idea of 
accommodating Islamic fundamentalism. This has led me to believe that a reader may 
misinterpret my intentions with this paper. This is not an apologetic attempt to defend the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic fundamentalism. I am in no way justifying or excusing 
the violence occasionally employed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, I am not 
outlining a path that could lead to fundamentalists eventually gaining control of the 
viii 
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government. An Egyptian version of the Islamic Republic of Iran would be a bad thing 
for the Egyptian people and for the region. What I am trying to do is demonstrate how 
allowing limited participation in government and society can prevent moderate Islamic 
fundamentalist groups from radicalizing and embracing violent tactics and revolutionary 
rhetoric. Furthermore, a government can use limited inclusion as a tool to control the 
message and to marginalize the power of the fundamentalist groups in society while 
maintaining peace and stability. 
ix 
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Throughout Islamic history there has been a tendency on the part of many 
Muslims, when confronted with what they consider to be an external threat to their power 
or sovereignty, to develop religious organizations that advocate a retreat into 
fundamentalism. Such organizations believe that Islamic society has lost its way and that 
what is required to set it back on the 'straight path' are reforms whose general themes 
hark back to the original ways and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and the first 
generation of rightly guided caliphs (roughly 610-661). Historically, such movements 
have generally involved only a small minority of the population, but they were often 
regarded as highly subversive by the ruling powers, who generally reacted with 
repression, discrimination and violence. This combination of reprisals by the authorities 
and a general lack of broad societal support frequently encouraged the fundamentalist 
movements to radicalize and become more extreme. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the ideology, function and historical 
development of the Muslim Brotherhood, a fundamentalist Islamic, and would-be pan-
Islamic, organization founded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928. The Brotherhood 
spread out from Egypt and gradually established independent 'nat ional ' branches 
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throughout the Middle East. I will use the experiences of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
their interaction with the state, using Egypt and Jordan as case studies, in order to 
demonstrate that the repressive measures and the reprisals carried out by the Egyptian 
government against the Brotherhood have led to violence, terrorism and in general to 
profound instability. Meanwhile, the relative tolerance and inclusiveness toward the 
Brotherhood demonstrated by the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan has led to a largely 
stable, peaceful and symbiotic relationship. The monarchy has allowed the Musl im 
Brotherhood limited political participation, but has always ensured that the organization 
remained a minority in government. In return, the Brotherhood in Jordan has, over time, 
significantly altered its philosophy and ideology to accommodate government policies. 
Essentially, it seems that a state 's best response to the emergence of a 
fundamentalist socio-religious movement is to allow it limited inclusion in the political 
system before rejection or persecution leads it to radicalize and become a threat to the 
power structure of the regime or the peace and stability of the society. The more 
inclusive approach accomplishes three things. First, it provides the fundamentalists with 
a platform giving them access to the public from which they can deliver their message, 
thus making participation in the system more appealing than opposition to it. Second, the 
state gains legitimacy by incorporating the fundamentalists into the system and getting 
the fundamentalists to play by the state 's rules. Third, this access to the public and to the 
government through incorporation into the system has tended to head off radicalization 
and extremism in fundamentalist movements . 
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Overview of the Muslim Brotherhood 
The Muslim Brotherhood is an interesting case study in the history of religiously 
oriented organizations. Initially the Brotherhood was an organization founded upon a 
form of Islamic nationalism that emerged from the political tensions of nineteenth and 
twentieth century Egypt. Previous fundamentalist Islamic scholars influenced its 
motivation and objectives, yet they were not backward looking and reactionary. 1 It was 
primarily influenced by three factors. First, it was an Islamic response, through gradual 
social and economic reform programs, to the Western (and to some extent Christian) 
influences of the nineteenth century that were engaged in the gradual Westernization and 
modernization of Muslim society. Second, the nationalist ideology of the Brotherhood led 
it to develop as an anticolonial movement entirely opposed to the foreign domination of 
Egypt. Third, the Brotherhood sought to navigate an Islamic path through the intellectual 
conflict between conservatism and modernism. To further clarify this point, prior to the 
twentieth century, Islamic fundamentalist organizations were almost exclusively 
conservative and traditionalist in orientation. The experiences of the Muslim world in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including the decline in the relative power of the 
Ottoman empire compared to the Western powers as well as the colonialism of the 
mandates, led to an intellectual debate within the Muslim world concerning the need to 
modernize society versus the desire to retain traditional conservative Islamic social 
values. The Musl im Brotherhood sought to discover an Islamic path that could 
1
 This will be elaborated upon below in Chapter II, The Intellectual Origins of Islamic Fundamentalism. 
2 
Christina Harris. Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt (The Hague: The Hoover Institution, 1964), p. 
14. 
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14. 
4 
accommodate Western style modernization programs while retaining traditional 
fundamentalist ideologies. This willingness to accept modernization indicates that the 
Muslim Brotherhood was innovative and revolutionary among Islamic fundamentalist 
organizations. 
The Musl im Brotherhood has branches throughout the Muslim world yet lacks a 
central directing authority. Though each branch is founded upon basically the same 
guiding principles as the original core Egyptian organization, all are locally organized 
and locally directed. This situation allows us to observe how each branch interacted with 
the governments and political situation in their respective countries and document the 
consequences of these interactions. This study will analyze the relationships between the 
Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jordanian branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood with their respective governments. My goal is to compare and contrast the 
largely repressive and violent methods of the Egyptian government with the much less 
confrontational relationship between the Hashemite monarchy and the Jordanian branch 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in order to demonstrate that allowing limited participation in 
government and civil society is probably the most effective means of preventing Islamic 
fundamentalist organizations from radicalizing and adopting an extremist position that 
promotes insurrection. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF ISLAMIC 
FUNDAMENTALISM 
In order to understand the motives and goals of the Muslim Brotherhood it is first 
necessary to examine the evolution of Islamic fundamentalist thought. Twentieth century 
Islamic fundamentalism arose largely in response to the Islamic community 's dual need 
to address both modernity and colonialism. The eclipse of the Ottoman Empire by 
Western Europe brought up some troubling questions for the religious community. The 
modern world, represented by the Western powers, was an alien culture to the Muslim 
world. Secularism, nationalism and liberalism were foreign concepts not at all conducive 
to the traditional Islamic environment, yet these foreign ideologies were overwhelming 
the Muslim world. This sense of being besieged, of having one ' s entire worldview called 
into question, lent this debate a great sense of urgency. The modern Islamic 
fundamentalist had to find a way to create a modern Islam that could exist in this 
environment without betraying the core values of the faith. Before examining the 
Muslim Brotherhood's efforts to address this crisis we must first explore what the core 
"traditional" values of Islamic fundamentalism are, how they have evolved and how they 
influenced Islamic fundamentalist organizations in the twentieth century. 
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Ibn Taymiyya 
The cornerstone of much of modern Islamic fundamentalist thought and practice 
can be traced back to the thirteenth century Muslim theologian Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya 
(1263-1328). Ibn Taymiyya was born in Harran, near the present day border between 
Turkey and Syria. As a child he and his family were forced to flee to Damascus to 
escape the Mongol invasions. The history of these Mongol campaigns is relevant to this 
chapter because it had a profound psychological impact upon Ibn Taymiyya. In 1258, a 
few years before his birth, the great Islamic city of Baghdad was destroyed. In his 
lifetime, Damascus was sacked, Jerusalem attacked and enemies intent on destroying it 
surrounded the Muslim world. The belief that God had forsaken the Muslim people and 
that the end of the civilized world was at hand would have been widely preached. This 
situation would greatly influence Ibn Taymiyya ' s philosophy. 
The Mongols had the ultimate goal of conquering Egypt. The second incarnation 
of the 'Abbasid Empire was an obstacle to this and needed to be conquered as well. The 
Mongols began invading Greater Syria in 1253, sacking Baghdad in 1258. 
Circumventing most of Syria and passing through Central Asia, they reached as far west 
as present day Turkey and into Gaza, in Palestine where they allied with the Christian 
Crusader states against the 'Abbasids. However, the commanding general Hulagu 
withdrew with most of his forces following the Great Khan ' s death back in Mongolia. 
Later, Hulagu, now a Khan himself, had the remaining forces he had left behind in Syria 
resume the invasion of Syria. In 1260 the Muslim Egyptian Mamluks defeated the 
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7 
Mongol forces at the Battle of Ayn Jalut. Less than a year later the Mongols were again 
defeated at the Battle of Horns and completely expelled from Syria. However, the 
Mongols would remain in control of Persia and would periodically mass forces in order 
to invade Syria. For example, in 1299 the Mongols defeated a Mamluk army at the battle 
of Wadi al-Khazander, causing the majority of the population of Damascus to flee the 
city before it was sacked. 4 However, even though the Mongols controlled the area for 
several months and raided as far afield as Gaza and Jerusalem, this campaign to take 
Syria was also short-lived. The Mongol forces faced their final defeat by the Mamluks 
at the Battle of Shaqhab in 1303. 5 
The Mongols had pagan, polytheistic and animistic-based religious beliefs 
(although Hulagu 's wife was a Nestorian Christian) and a reputation for the wholesale 
massacre of every living thing in areas that attempted to resist them. The Mongols had 
brought about the fall of the 'Abbasid caliphate in 1258, which was followed by the 
virtually complete destruction of Baghdad. Irrigation systems were destroyed, mosques 
torn down, libraries burnt and many thousands of people in the city were killed. To a 
devout Muslim, the inability of the Muslims to stand against these godless barbarians was 
viewed as a punishment from God for the collective sins of their society. The success of 
the Mongols and the subjugation of the Muslims was viewed by many as the end of 
J
 J.J. Saunders, The History of the Mongol Conquests (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1971) pp. 
119-139. 
4
 Adh-Dhahabi, Record of the Destruction of Damascus by the Mongols in 1299-1301 Translated by Joseph 
Somogyi . From: Ignace Goldziher Memorial Volume, Part 1 Ed. Samuel Lowinger and Joseph Somogyi , 
Budapest, 1948. 
5
 Saunders, pp. 119-121. 
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civilization. This forced many to revaluate themselves and focus upon their spiritual 
identity. 
After the failure of the initial Mongol invasions, the Mongols began to adopt 
some aspects of the cultures that they had conquered in Persia, often incorporating Turkic 
and Muslim people into their military. This was formalized with the conversion to Islam 
of the Ilkhan ruler Ghazan (r. 1295-1304) to Islam in 1296. However, this did not put an 
immediate end to the Mongol conquest of the Arab world as demonstrated in the 
campaign discussed above that ended in 1303 at the battle of Shaqhab. 6 This means they 
were killing fellow Muslims, a sin explicitly forbidden in the Qur 'an . Anger at this 
hypocrisy and bastardization of the Islamic faith was the catalyst that helped to form Ibn 
Taymiyya ' s philosophy. 
The external threat the empire faced instigated a desire to purify the faith and to 
purge the faith of the false Muslims or those who had converted but failed to fully adopt 
all of the tenets of Islam, Specifically the Mongols who settled in Persia and the Turkic 
nomadic populations. Essentially, throughout Ibn Taymiyya ' s life, non-Muslim enemies 
were determined to destroy the Muslim Empire and it seemed as if the heart of Islam 
itself was under siege. Mongols and their allies controlled the formerly Muslim Persian 
Empire to the east and the Central Asian lands to the north. Crusader states dotted the 
Palestinian coast and the English, French and German Christians seemed determined to 
capture Jerusalem and Egypt. Ibn Taymiyya lived during a period of intense and 
6
 Saunders, pp. 126-39. 
         
r       
          
        
 i          
i    t    t  
       .   
        
        
i '  l
         
           
  i ll       
  t i '   
          l
lf        
       
          
          
6 
9 
prolonged crisis for the Musl im world and this atmosphere greatly influenced his 
philosophy. 
Ibn Taymiyya ' s father and grandfather were both respected theologians with 
whom pious Muslims would consult on spiritual matters. Ibn Tamiyya followed in their 
footsteps and quickly demonstrated an aptitude and genius for the field. He rapidly 
developed a reputation as an uncompromising conservative religious authority. He would 
kick over the gaming tables of strangers in the street. He had an amazing ability to 
offend powerful people with ties to the local leadership; he was imprisoned many times 
over the years and ultimately died in the prison of the citadel of Damascus. However, he 
also inspired a core of loyal followers. 
In 1282 he replaced his father as a professor of Hanbali law in Damascus. In 
Damascus, and later Cairo, he professed that the true path of Islam was not to be found in 
the contemporary teachings of the 'ulama. He claimed that the true path had been 
abandoned and distorted by not adhering strictly and exclusively to the Qur 'an and the 
hadith, the collections of the words, teachings and accounts of the actions of the prophet 
Muhammad. The stunning military successes of the impious Mongols, who practiced, at 
best, an adulterated form of Islam, was God ' s punishment for abandoning the true path of 
the Islam and allowing less worthy influences to permeate Islam. 
Contemporary Islamic jurists and 'ulama believed that the gates of ijtihad, or 
interpretation of religious doctrine, were closed. Though there is some debate about the 
accuracy of this among modern scholars, it remained a matter of official doctrine, if not 
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10 
the actual practices of the jurists and the 'u lama. 7 This means that the 'ulama were not to 
search religious texts anew for meaning but rather were expected to rely upon 600 years 
of established precedent in order to answer religious questions. To Ibn Taymiyya, a 
personal relationship and interpretation of the religious texts was a prerequisite for 
enlightenment. These beliefs and practices put Ibn Taymiyya at odds with other 
contemporary religious authorities and the local rulers who desired peace and stability 
over an esoteric exploration of the meaning of the State 's religion. In a sense, he was the 
Muslim equivalent of Martin Luther. 
Ibn Taymiyya ' s writings were even more controversial than his sermons, since he 
focused particularly on the political realm. Most members of the Ulama wisely chose to 
avoid the topic. Ibn Taymiyya, however, believed that the issue of good and righteous 
governance was integral to Islam. Essentially, he believed in the restoration of a unified 
Islamic empire ruled by a "rightly guided" Caliph. In reality, the Muslim world had not 
been unified under a single ruler since the early ' Abbasid period. 
With fellow religious scholars unwilling to criticize their rulers and the realization 
that a Caliphate modeled after the seventh century was an impossible dream by the late 
thirteenth century, Ibn Tayimyya found himself virtually alone leading the call for 
societal reforms and the return to a purer and more idealized form of Islam. He 
formulated a unique vision that would, in his opinion, preserve the essence of the era of 
the rightly guided caliphs in the contemporary political and social context. Recognizing 
7
 Wael Hallaq, 'Was the Gate o f Ijtihadclosed?" IJMES, 16, 1984 pp. 3-41 . 
Michael Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003) pp. 145-64. 
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11 
that there was no longer a divinely chosen leader who embodied supreme religious 
authority and unchallenged political control, he proposed that the relationship between 
the ruler and the subjects was a contract under which the Emirs would provide just rule in 
accordance with Islamic law, and the people would give him their obedience in exchange. 
However, this contract presupposed the existence of a religious leader who would 
provide a pious example and give guidance to the people on matters of morality and faith. 
The modern Islamic fundamentalists generally interpret this to mean that Ibn 
Taymiyya believed that the clergy should fill this role, thus endowing the 'ulama with 
authority separate from the government. Essentially, by filtering their reading of Ibn 
Taymiyya through their own contemporary experiences with modern secularism they 
believe that he had written about a similar situation in the thirteenth century. Based on 
this faulty supposition modern fundamentalists believe that Ibn Taymiyya wished to 
reverse a centuries long trend in which the political arena had gradually become more 
secularized and the religious authorities more marginalized and therefore that he believed 
that religion should not be subordinate to government and that an impious leader who 
failed to follow proper Islamic law was no more than an apostate, implying that it would 
be the sacred duty of all Muslims to depose such a leader. To fail to do, or to follow such 
a leader, would be a rejection of the Word of God and would be viewed as apostasy as 
well. 
Obviously, the government did not appreciate these radical views. The notion 
that people not only had a right but a duty to overthrow the government was 
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unacceptable. This made him an enemy of the government and a hero to the 
marginalized and disaffected in society. 
Another pillar of Ibn Taymiyya's ideology was reemphasizing the concept of 
jihad or holy struggle. He equated the waging of jihad with righteous war. Jihad had 
been invoked many times in Islamic history and can be referenced in the Qur'an (Sura 
2:190) and (Sura 9:5). 9 Usually jihad is referenced in defense of Islam or Muslim land. 
But by the late thirteenth century, jihad was used as one of many arguments in favor of 
militaristic expansion, forcefully bringing the enlightenment of Islam to infidels. Prior to 
this, namely the initial expansion under the Umayyad caliphs, the spread of Islam was not 
a primary or even secondary goal of the conquest. However, by the time of the 
establishment of the Sultanate, Arab Muslim culture and society had evolved and 
developed to the point that imperial territorial expansion was viewed through the lenses 
of religion. Therefore, by invoking the faith, the argument could be made that it had 
become the duty of the entire community to assist in raising an army for this purpose. 
The modern Islamic fundamentalist interprets Ibn Taymiyya's elevation of the 
importance of jihad as a duty of every Muslim as sanctifying the use of offensive 
warfare. 
In the thirteenth century, warfare was always directed by the political authority, if 
not the sultan then a provincial governor or other respected individual imbued with 
executive authority, and was usually a seasonal exercise. However, there was also a 
defensive form of jihad. If Muslim lands were threatened, it became the duty of all 
9
 David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005) pp. 5-11. 
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Muslim individuals to fight in defense of Islam, independent of the political leadership 
and the community.1 0 
Ibn Taymiyya elevated jihad to the level of one of the five pillars of Islam and 
declared that it was an essential requirement for all Muslims and that it should always be 
independent of the political authority. He then took jihad a step further and stated that it 
could be invoked not just for dealing with external enemies but was also appropriate for 
dealing with internal enemies. Essentially, he advocated invoking jihad in order to purge 
the faith of those perceived as being impious. 
To the modern fundamentalist, turning jihad inward does two things. First, it 
allows Muslims to kill 'impious' Muslims on the grounds that one is protecting the 
integrity of the umma by punishing apostasy. Second, it creates a mechanism for forcible 
reform within the Muslim community.1 1 
The Mamluk Sultan used this interpretation of jihad in order to wage war against 
the Muslim Mongols. In the 1320s the Mamluk sultan Nasir commissioned a fatwa from 
Ibn Taymiyya authorizing the campaign. The victory over the Mongols ended the 
Mongol threat to Syria and resulted in a long-standing peace treaty in 1323. However, in 
1517 the Mamlukes were to be defeated by the Ottomans (that is, the replacement of one 
Muslim dynasty by another stronger one), and in a sense, with the external threat 
removed, Ibn Taymiyya's teachings went out of style. Though his philosophy was never 
mainstream or embraced by the masses, the clear and present danger faced by the 
1 0
 Ibid., pp. 57-63 . 
1 1
 [bid., pp. 65-66 . 
       
 . 10   mty. 
 tedjihud   lsl  
  t  
  kjihud  rt r   t 
  t    
 okingjihud  
   
 m li t, ingjihud    
    
 u    f r i
   ity. I I 
    jihud i  r er t  e ar i t 
    utwu 
      
    
 t   t  
    
'       




Mamluk empire made the doom and gloom aspects of his teachings popular among a 
growing religiously fanatical fringe of society. Also, since his philosophy was generally 
in conformity with the wider goals of the Sultan it was often expedient to invoke his 
unique perspective in order to bolster the military campaign against the Mongols. When 
the threat was removed after the military victory over the Mongols and the conclusion of 
the peace treaty in 1323, his doomsday philosophy fell out of vogue. However, whenever 
conditions in the Muslim world seemed similar to those of the thirteenth century, and the 
people felt threatened by an outside power, there has often been a resurgence of 
fundamentalist organizations and a revival of Ibn Taymiyya's radical teachings. 
The external threat to the Muslim empire by the invading, seemingly 
unstoppable Mongols and the ensuing self-analysis that the Islamic community went 
through led to calls for reform. The pious believed that their society had strayed too far 
away from the true path of Islam and that a return to the ways of the Prophet and his 
companions was vitally necessary. Ibn Taymiyya had been a firsthand witness of the 
atrocities suffered by the Muslims under the Mongols. When the Mongols later 
converted to Islam this tempered and focused his anger against those whom he judged 
were false Muslims. Out of these feelings emerged a philosophy that advocated the harsh 
imposition of fundamentalist ideology and violent repression of dissent within the 
Muslim community that allowed for no tolerance of un-Islamic behavior. Furthermore, it 
reinforced the standard political theory that the legitimacy of the Muslim rulers was 
contingent upon their piety and adherence to shar 'ia law. If the ruler failed to live up to 
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his responsibilities it was the Muslim people's religious duty to rebel against him or risk 
apostasy themselves. 
'Abd al-Wahhab 
The Wahhabi movement that emerged in eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Arabia was an extreme fundamentalist movement based on the Hanbali school. 
The Ottomans ruled the Arab world from 1517 until their collapse at the end of 
World War I. The Ottomans originated as a regional force around 1300 and expanded 
first into Europe. They controlled much of the Balkans, capturing Kosovo in 1389 and 
then expanded into Anatolia, capturing Constantinople in 1453. Despite the opinion that 
the Ottoman Empire was essentially in a slow and steady decline for five centuries as 
expressed by Bernard Lewis in What Went Wrong? 12 many periods of Ottoman rule can 
be characterized as prosperous and relatively stable. The central government was firmly 
in control and there were no real external threats. In fact, the early history of the 
Ottoman Empire was generally one of expansion. Without a crisis or an external threat to 
act as a catalyst for self-analysis and instigate a call for fundamentalist reform, the 
citizens of the Ottoman Empire were content to live life in much the same way as they 
had for generations. Essentially, there was no significant undercurrent of dissent or 
public sentiment calling for the reform of society, government or the practice of the faith. 
1 2
 Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong ? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East, 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2002) . 
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However, this gradually began to change in the eighteenth century, with the 
Empire's slow but growing loss of power and territory in Europe to Russia and Austria, 
and later its loss of its own economic monopoly to Western European powers that were 
emerging as colonial and trade oriented power bases. The central government in Istanbul 
had been losing control of the periphery of the empire, increasingly to both European 
powers and local warlords in the late eighteenth century. It remained more or less in 
control of the urban centers, but partly due to financial constraints, had to rely 
increasingly on local, if not always loyal or dependable, notables to govern and control 
the rural hinterland. This sense of the weakness of the central government and the 
"decline of civilization" in general caused the beginning of the stirrings of movements 
that could trace their intellectual ancestry more or less explicitly to Ibn Taymiyya. 
One of the most prominent and influential of these new fundamentalists was 
Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, who was born in 1703 in the village al-'Uyayna in 
Najd in present day Saudi Arabia. He was descended from a line of Islamic judges and 
went through formal religious training in Medina and Baghdad. He developed a 
reputation for extreme and radical ideas. For example, while still a young man studying 
at a seminary in Basra he was thrown out for accusing the entire population of apostasy. 
al-Wahhab continued his religious studies by traveling east to Isfahan and Qum in Persia. 
This broad course of study across the Muslim world exposed him to many different 
approaches to Islam. This experience directly led to al-Wahhab formulating an 
interpretation of an unadulterated Islam, based upon his conception of the true Islam of 
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its seventh-century founders. His interpretation of Islam was stripped of all innovation 
and reinterpretation. 
al-Wahhab believed in the primacy of monotheism, the denunciation of all forms 
of meditation between God and worshippers and believed that a true Muslim was 
required to pay a religious tax to the leader of the community. Furthermore, al-Wahhab 
believed that it was the obligation of a Muslim to engage in jihad against anyone who did 
not conform to these principles. 
When al-Wahhab began to develop a following he promoted the teachings of Ibn 
Taymiyya and reestablished respect for his teachings among the new fundamentalist 
movements and those movements that would follow, essentially rescuing Ibn Yaymiyya 
from the dustbin of history. Like Ibn Taymiyya, al-Wahhab focused upon the Qur'an 
and the hadith and rejected later practices. He also attacked the folk customs that had 
become an integral element of rural society and had taken on quasi-religious significance, 
such as visiting the tombs, venerating saints, leaving food offerings for the dead, etc. 1 4 He 
further denounced Sufism and Shi'ism as being un-Islamic, believing that such practices 
should be punished by death.1 5 He and his followers would desecrate popular shrines in 
protest.1 6 al-Wahhab viewed innovation (bid'a) as the path to sin and believed that 
innovation had perverted the message of Islam, returning society to jahiliyya, the age of 
barbarism that preceded the Prophet. al-Wahhab believed it was necessary to avoid all 
l j
 Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) . p. 16. 
1 4
 Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, (New York: N e w York University Press, 2000) . pp. 77-78 
& Rasheed, pp. 17-18. 
1 5
 Cook, p.75. 
1 6
 Vasiliev, pp. 77-78. 
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forms of shirk, polytheism, and to reform society to bring it back to the true path of 
Islam. One of his most significant contributions to Islamic jurisprudence was his liberal 
use of takfir, or the process of denouncing a Muslim as an infidel for not adhering strictly 
to the faith.1 7 Radical militant fundamentalist groups would revive this practice in the 
1970s and 1980s with violent results. 
The increasingly radical opinions and actions of al-Wahhab and his followers led 
to his expulsion from al-'Uyayna by the local political leadership in 1744. He relocated 
to the village of Dara'iya at the invitation of the Shaykh Muhammad ibn Sa'ud (r. 1735-
65), whose wife was one of his supporters. This would lead to the development of a 
remarkable partnership that has lasted to the present day, the formation of a symbiotic 
relationship that helped each side achieve its goals. The Sa'udis gained political power 
and territorial control while the "Wahhabis" were allowed to carry out their program of 
radical reform throughout the newly acquired land. When Muhammad ibn Sa'ud died in 
1765, much of the Arabian peninsula had been consolidated under Sa'udi control and 
1 Q 
'Abd al-Wahhab's version of Islam reigned supreme. 
The Sa'ud family and the Wahhabis continued their partnership; Sa'udi armies, 
led first by 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Muhammad (1765-1803) and then by his son Sa'ud (1803-
1814), conquered most of central and eastern Arabia by 1792, acquired Bahrain and 
Qatar by 1797, sacked the Shi'i holy city of Karbala' in 1802, occupied the Hijaz, 
1 7
 Cook, p. 75. 
1 8
 Cook, p. 86. 
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including Mecca and Medina, by 1803-1804.1 9 They also raided Iraq and Syria in the 
early nineteenth century, forcing the Ottomans into series of confrontations in which they 
were eventually pushed back. The Sa'ud family's fortunes declined throughout much of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance continued to 
thrive.2 0 
Ultimately, the doctrines of the Wahhabi movement showed similarities with 
those of Ibn Taymiyya, with the important difference that al-Wahhab managed to put his 
fundamentalist reform project at the service of a politically and territorially expansionist 
regime. This combination of political and military strength combined with an 
uncompromising religious devotion would be a model that future extremist groups would 
attempt to recreate in the late twentieth century. 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (18387-1897) was most likely born in Asadabad, Iran, 
although, since he would have more resonance politically as a Sunni than as a Shi'i, he 
claimed to be from Afghanistan. He was the first modern Muslim activist to attempt to 
utilize the power of Islam specifically in the political arena. His goals were essentially 
political, but he recognized the power of religion and made use of it. Moreover, by 
recognizing the appeal of Islam, he was able to integrate his calls for internal reform into 
a 'religious' argument: in order to confront the challenge of the West, it would be 
19 
Vassiliev, pp. 83-111 . 
2 0
 Cook, p. 86. 
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necessary to reform society and Islam itself, which he determined to have become 
debased by poor leadership. 
Afghani recognized that foreign influence and sometimes even outright foreign 
control of civil society, economic policies and even occasionally some of the 
governments of the Muslim world were occurring throughout the Muslim world. This 
situation alarmed and outraged Afghani. Therefore, he emphasized the political side of 
Islam as an anti-imperialist doctrine that would help revive "national pride" and mobilize 
the Muslim world to resist Western interference. al-Afghani argued strongly against the 
idea of the creation of individual Muslim national states, and called for a single Islamic 
state, the unification of all countries with an Islamic tradition. His approach was a break 
with tradition, calling for the restoration of purified Islamic values and the unification of 
all Muslims in defense of Islam. 
al-Afghani traveled widely throughout the Islamic world and Europe, gaining 
first-hand knowledge of the conditions of European progress and Muslim subjugation. He 
instigated a life-long campaign of political agitation that took him from Iran to 
Afghanistan, India, Egypt, France, Britain and Russia. He served at the Qajar court and 
eventually at the Ottoman court in Istanbul. Everywhere he went, he counseled leaders, 
led religious and political demonstrations against Western imperialism and its local allies, 
and called for external unity and internal reform of the Islamic world. 
As a political program, Pan-Islam was no match for the challenges and 
opportunities of the newly developing world of nations. Instead, one of the major new 
developments that emerged from the collaboration between al-Afghani and his disciple 
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Muhammed 'Abduh was the emergence of Islamic modernism, in which people in a 
number of areas worked to create an effective synthesis of Islam and modernity. In 
addition, although indirectly and unintentionally, al-Afghani laid the basis for later 
radical Islam or Islamic fundamentalism. 
Ultimately, the pan-Islamic movement was a calculated political maneuver that 
used Islam as the primary tool in an attempt to unify the diverse Muslim peoples of Asia 
and Africa to combat Western territorial and political encroachment on the Muslim 
world. The relative decline in power of the Ottoman and Persian Empires when 
compared to the Western Empires demanded that drastic reforms take place. 
Modernization and the adoption of certain Western institutions were essential to the 
survival and the success of these civilizations. However, they risked losing their culture 
through assimilation to Western ideals. al-Afghani wished to thread the needle by 
reasserting the fundamental religious ties that defined Muslims as separate from and 
superior to the West while adopting many of the technologies, sciences, military and 
bureaucratic structures of the West. 
Attempts to unify the Muslim people under a single banner failed. Nevertheless 
in Iran, the Tobacco Revolt of 1891, the assassination of Nasser ed-Din Shah in 1898, 
and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-09 can all be traced to al-Afghani's influence. 
His legacy included anti-imperialism, anti-absolutism, and Islamic reform. To a 
considerable extent, these legacies converged in the constitutional movements in the 
Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Iran. Many modern Islamist movements have adopted al-
Afghani as their founding father and extremist movements have embraced radical 
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militant Islam as a tool to achieve pan Islamic goals and emphasize the political power of 
Islam. 
One of the earliest Islamic political movements was Ikhwan al-Muslimin, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, established by Hasan al-Banna in 1929. He adopted an absolutely 
Utopian approach towards the problem facing the colonial countries." The failure of 
previous anticolonial efforts, and the relentless pressures on nonreligious opposition 
movements in the Middle East exerted by the Western powers eventually opened the way 
to the political Islam of the last few decades. Political movements like the Muslim 
Brotherhood see Islam as a binding social force that transcends the borders of secular 
nation states, although in practice, members' activities are generally confined to their 
'own' countries. At the present time, Brotherhood members are actively involved in the 
politics of Egypt, Jordan Sudan and several other Middle Eastern states. The Muslim 
Brotherhood will be explained in greater detail in the following chapters. 
However, al-Afghani's pan-Islamic political ideology was significantly different 
from today's political Islam. Islamic nineteenth-century political and social reformers 
could pursue three different projects: they could strive for a return to fundamentalism, 
much like the Wahhabis. Second, they could embrace Western-style modernism and 
accept the gradual secularization of Islamic society. Third, they could reinterpret the 
basic tenets of Islam in the context of modern rational and liberal thought, that is, 
Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962). p. 114. 
22 
Thus the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood are not administratively 
linked. The major exceptions here are the more militant transnational (and usually clandestine) associations 
like al-Qa'ida. 
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essentially reopening the gate of ijtihadr Although not a 'conventional religious 
scholar' (he had no formal training) al-Afghani chose the third path, thus using religion in 
order to achieve political goals. Modern Islamic fundamentalist organizations seek to 
achieve the opposite, to reshape the political arena to conform to their religious 
interpretation of the world. 
al-Afghani's principal disciple was an Egyptian, Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-
1905), who would become one of the primary inspirations for the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Both al-Afghani and 'Abduh believed that reason, Islam and modern science were 
compatible, though this required the dismantling of the traditional social, economic, and 
political institutions of the Muslim world, which had gradually become perversions of true 
Islam. Whereas 'Abd al-Wahhab had sought a return to a purer form of Islam through 
emulation of the past, al-Afghani and Abduh sought to find new meaning by intepreting 
the Qur'an in a modern context. 
In Paris, al-Afghani and 'Abduh founded an Islamic society and a journal called 
al- 'Urwa al-Wuthqa, 'the Indissoluble Bond'. While there, al-Afghani engaged in a 
running debate with the philosopher Renan. However, 'Abduh would break with al-
Afghani in 1892, when the latter returned to Istanbul at the invitation of Sultan 'Abd al-
Hamid II. 'Abduh himself returned to Egypt in 1889, and was later appointed Grand 
Mufti, a position he held until his early death. 'Abduh differed from his mentor in several 
crucial areas, and in particular was less of a revolutionary and more of a gradualist. He 
also had a limited role in the Egyptian nationalist movement. 
2 j
 Harris, p. 115. 
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Another aspect of al-Afghani's pan-Islamic vision was his reinterpretation of the 
role of leaders in an Islamic society. He argued that 
The divisions which have occurred in Muslim States originate only from the 
failure of rulers who deviate from the solid principles upon which the Islamic 
faith is built and leave the road which was followed by their early ancestors. 
When those who rule Islam return to the rules of their law and model their 
conduct upon that practiced by the early generations of Muslims it will not be 
long before God gives them extensive power and bestows strength upon them 
comparable to that wielded by the orthodox caliphs, who were leaders of the 
faith."2 4 
al-Afghani also believed that leaders should be held accountable for their actions, 
and argued that limitations on the absolute authority of the ruler are essential to prevent 
despotism. The people have the right to depose and replace a bad leader. We can observe 
al-Afghani putting his theory into practice with the assassination of Nasser al-Din Shah, 
ruler of the Qajar Empire in 1896. This questioning of the leadership rejects the idea of 
divine right of kings and shares many aspects of the nationalist view of the exceptionality 
of the nation rather than the king. It also flirts with the democratic principle of popular 
sovereignty, or rule by the consent of the governed. It also echoes Ibn Taymiyya's 
teaching that it is the duty of the people to remove a bad leader. 
Some of al-Afghani's ideas on the nature of leadership and reform would be 
highly influential in the prelude to the Iranian constitutional movement of 1905, 
especially an attempt to prevent absolutism. However, the promise of reform brought by 
the constitutional revolution collapsed in 1911, when pressures from Britain and Russia 
combined with powerful internal forces to disband the parliament and suspend the 
2 4
 Hourani, p. 114. 
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constitution. What followed was rule by a series of Bakhtiari chiefs and the 
reestablishment of the monarchy under Ahmad Shah, and subsequently somewhat more 
permanently under the Pahlavis. 
According to Keddie, al-Afghani's vision of pan-Islam expressed through his 
writings bore many hallmarks of the traditional definition of nationalism. These include 
an aggressive cultural defensiveness, a superiority complex in relation to Christianity and 
a call for a revival of a distant and idealized past.2 5 His rhetoric was focused upon uniting 
against Western encroachment under the banner of Islam. Essentially, he wanted the 
national identity of the umma to become Islam. In a sense, al-Afghani tried to use Islam 
as a political tool in order to bind the people together into a cohesive single nation. As in 
other nation-building efforts, he accentuated the differences between "us" (Muslims) and 
"them" (Western imperialists) while downplaying the regional, ethnic, linguistic, class 
and cultural differences within the national identity he was forging. 
Unity around Islam was conducive to this because of the strict separation of 
identity within Islam: there are Muslims and there are infidels. Cultural differences that 
existed within Islam, (ethnic, linguistic, geographic) were secondary to religious identity. 
Specifically, Islam was considered a stronger bond in unity of the umma more than any 
other binding social tie, so that the difference between a Muslim and a non-Muslim 
trumps any other similarities or differences among the Muslim population as a whole. 
An individual's membership in the community is based upon his/her submission to God 
and his/her adoption of the faith. Ethnicity, status, birth etc. do not matter. This makes 
2 5
 Keddie, pp. 24-25. 
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identifying the nation easier. It also makes the composition of the pan-Islamic nation 
fluid. Calls to aid a Muslim country under the yoke of foreign oppression could be a 
rallying cry in support of 'our brothers'. However, the people or rulers of a Muslim 
country willingly cooperating with foreign interests could be characterized as "bad 
Muslims" and "infidels" and therefore not part of the nation. However, by ignoring or 
not addressing the differences between the diverse groups that make up the pan-Islamic 
nation, al-Afghani failed to provide a model that could be implemented beyond the 
theoretical level. Basically, his rhetoric was appealing but it would be impossible to 
realize such a far-reaching and all-encompassing plan. Pan-Arabism would face similar 
problems that would lead to its ultimate failure, but it had an advantage over pan-Islam in 
that it acknowledged the need to address some of the fundamental differences within the 
umma. 
'Abduh and al-Afghani believed that Muslims must cooperate both to reverse 
internal decline and to counter European colonialism. They called for a return to the spirit 
of early Islam and a reinterpretation of the Qur'an to meet the needs of the modern world. 
They believed that some limited borrowing of Western ideas was permissible and that the 
use of reason was not in conflict with religious revelation. After 'Abduh's death his 
disciple Muhammad Rashid Rida continued to carry and develop the reformist message 
of al-Afghani and 'Abduh to the Islamic world. 
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Muhammed 'Abduh and Rashid Rida 
Muhammad Rashid Rida (September 23, 1865, - August 22, 1935) was born in 
Tripoli, Syria in 1865, and was an admirer of the writings of Muhammed 'Abduh. Upon 
completion of his studies in 1897 he immigrated to Egypt, where he became a disciple of 
'Abduh, eventually becoming his biographer. In fact, much of what is known of the 
details of 'Abduh's life comes from the writings of Rida and at times it becomes difficult 
to determine to whom to attribute certain ideas and philosophies, although a handful of 
ideas clearly originated with Rida. Rida supported the restoration of a religious caliphate; 
while 'Abduh largely ignored the issue, Rida viewed it as a viable Islamic alternative to 
Western nationalism. Rida also placed a heavy emphasis on the importance of the 
Sayyids or blood descendants of the Prophet while Abduh did not. 
Like Muhammad 'Abduh, Rida regarded education as the primary instrument of 
27 * * 
social change. He stressed the importance of incorporating religion into the educational 
system, ultimately establishing his own school with a curriculum that he designed. This 
school was aimed at young religious men and counted among its students an impressive 
• 28 
list of twentieth-century Muslim leaders. The emphasis on the need for religious 
education would become a cornerstone of the Muslim Brotherhood's philosophy. 
Under the guidance of Muhammad 'Abduh, Rida established the magazine al-
Manar (The Lighthouse) in 1898 and continued to publish it for thirty-seven years. In it 
he spoke for the Salafiyya movement, which combined a form of Islamic modernism with 
2 6
 M.A. Zaki Badawi. The Reformers of Egypt (London: The Muslim Institute, 1978) pp. 101-102. 
2 7
 Badawi, p. 116. 
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the search for inspiration in the example of early Islam. It sought to promote social, 
religious, political and economic reforms that demonstrated that Islam was compatible 
with contemporary conditions and that the shar 'ia was a practical judicial tool for a 
modern government.2 9 Rida republished many of Afghani and 'Abduh's writings in al 
Manar. Though Afghani and 'Abduh had been published before, their writings were not 
well known or widespread, and al-Manar introduced them to many sympathetic readers 
around the world. In a real sense, much of what is known of the teachings of al-Afghani 
and 'Abduh exists because of the efforts of Rida to continue spreading and expanding 
upon their ideas after their deaths. 
In response to a question in al-Manar about the nature of jihad, Rida addressed 
the aspect of the defensive qualities of jihad outlined in the Qur'an in the face of the 
obviously offensive expansion of the first empire in the seventh century. Rida had a very 
careful answer, positing that the proclamation of the truth is a primary goal of Islam. 
Non-Islamic neighbors are an obstacle to truth and thus opponents of Islam. Therefore, 
•J A 
aggressively removing them by force is, in effect, a defensive act. Though the vast 
majority of Rida's work on jihad calls for only limited and defensive warfare and focuses 
upon truth, this exchange is significant because, though not taken directly from Rida, the 
interpretation of offensive jihad is at the ideological core of modern radical and terrorist 
Islamic groups, and is their justification for carrying out violent attacks against Western 
-
}
 Badawi, p. 99. 
3 0
 Cook, p. 96. 
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interpretation of offensive jihad is at the ideological core of modem radical and terrorist 




civilians and local noncombatants. al Qaeda in Iraq is a perfect example of this principle 
in practice. 
Though Rida echoed his mentor's call for the purification of Islam and the 
improvement of higher education, he chose to emphasize the need to defend Islam from 
external attack.3 1 While 'Abduh could be interpreted as being pro-Western (at least with 
regard to structures and institutions) Rida sought to emphasize the need to eliminate the 
influences of Western culture without abandoning Western style reforms, including the 
incorporation of Western sciences and technologies. However, he viewed nationalism 
with some suspicion, since he associated it with secularism. Though he supported the 
nationalist goal of ending colonialism in the Muslim world, he viewed the inherently 
secular nature of nationalism as a threat to the Islamic community. He also believed that 
the Muslim world was a single entity and that nationalism would lead to the 
dismemberment of the umma. 
Rida was always an outsider in Egyptian affairs. Though he carried the 
fundamentalist torch for al-Afghani and 'Abduh he never received the political and social 
appointments that his predecessors received. This was partly due to his unwavering 
inflexibility on his positions and partly because of his foreign origin during a period of 
increasing nationalism. However, through Rida's writings and his preservation of the 
work of previous writers, twentieth-century Islamic fundamentalism found a message and 
a voice. 
j l
 David Sagiv, Fundamentalism and Intellectuals in Egypt 1973-1993 (London: Routledge, 1995) p. 23 . 
3 2
 Badawi, p. 128. 
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Rida grew more anti-Western after World War I, and exercised a profound 
influence upon Hasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brethren. His position never wavered 
and barely evolved over the decades. Ironically, he found himself beginning his career as 
a radical modernist only to see his position adopted, adapted and passed over by Egyptian 
nationalists. In effect, he became a traditionalist by default. The reform movement 
seemed to become increasingly irrelevant as it was eclipsed by the nationalist movement 
in Egypt. Yet the ideas would remain, to be embraced by another generation. 
Conclusion 
Ibn Taymiyya believed in restoring a romanticized golden age of Islam, and that 
the restoration of the caliphate would once again unite all Muslims under a single 
religiously-based government that possessed the mandate of Heaven. The Caliph would 
exercise an enlightened rule, based on shar 'ia law and would reverse the erosion of core 
Islamic values in society. This belief is a prime example of how extremism develops and 
evolves. The failure of government of his day to face the external threat of the Mongols 
was perceived as a punishment from God. If God is punishing the Muslim people it must 
be because they had failed to be good, pious Muslims and had strayed from the true path 
of Islam: the way to return to the true path is to reform society using the early days of the 
faith as a model. Ibn Taymiyya organized and led a minority movement in society that 
demanded that these changes be made, even though it was based upon a romanticized and 
glorified interpretation of the past. His fundamentalist followers were never in the 
majority and faced resistance from the government, the religious elites and mainstream 
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society. Frustrated, the fundamentalist movement then abandoned rhetoric and 
persuasion through dialogue and began to explore more radical means of achieving its 
goals. At this point it assumed an adversarial position in relation to the power structure. 
Ultimately, when the Mongol threat was removed, Ibn Taymiyya's movement to 
recreate the golden age of the first generation of Islam fell into disfavor and was almost 
forgotten until 'Abd al-Wahhab revived it in the eighteenth century. 'Abd al-Wahhab 
expanded upon Ibn Taymiyya's teachings and re forged Islamic fundamentalism for his 
time. Under the Wahhabis, Islamic fundamentalism became fused with religious 
philosophy in the service of political-territorial expansionist goals. With the emergence 
of the modern age in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire and Islamic civilization 
were both in decline. The West continued to outpace the Ottomans in military 
technology as well as in relative power and wealth, and the periphery of the empire 
gradually began to break away from Ottoman control. One by one the Ottoman 
territories in the Arab lands were taken over first by rebellious local forces and then by 
European occupiers. In Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Libya, Egypt, Greater Syria and Iraq, 
Ottoman rule came to an end. 
In the process, the empire fell increasingly in debt to Western banks, and Ottoman 
institutions became characterized by corruption, inefficiency and patronage. This 
stagnation and corruption hindered the Ottomans from being able to keep pace with 
Europe. The reforms in the Ottoman Empire, known as the tanzimat, occurred between 
the years 1839 and 1876 under a number of different sultans and marked attempts to 
preserve the empire in the face of direct Western competition. In addition, the Ottoman 
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state sought to redefine itself as a modern, bureaucratic, and tolerant state rather than 
simply as a Muslim dynasty. These moves alarmed pious Muslims who saw the role of 
their religion purposely being diminished. 
This situation of obvious weakness in the central government provided fertile 
ground for new calls for reform. Some, like al-Afghani, sought to redefine Islam in 
modern terms, which included a fundamental shift in the understanding of jihad. Instead 
of actual warfare and violent struggle, jihad was perceived as an internal struggle against 
the evil impulses within an individual's soul. This was called the greater jihad with the 
physically violent struggle now becoming the lesser jihad, a concept which would have 
been completely alien to both Ibn Taymiyya and ' Abd al-Wahhab. 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth and centuries the Muslim world had to face the 
increasing influence of the Western powers, which forced it to reexamine some of its 
most basic assumptions while compelling it to adopt many alien institutions. al-Afghani 
and 'Abduh emerged from within this environment, believing that the secret of the 
West's strength lay in its political and social organization. al-Afghani and 'Abduh sought 
to find a way to incorporate these structures into a Muslim ideology. Their disciple 
Rashid Rida had the task of continuing the work of his mentors while being faced with 
the further development of regional nationalist movements throughout the Arab and 
Muslim worlds. He preserved the teachings of his mentors and made them available to a 
wider audience. Islamist radicals today tend to prefer the example of al-Afghani, the 
relentless activist, to that of 'Abduh, the patient reformer; that they have access to both is 
largely due to the efforts of Rashid Rida. 
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Other Muslims during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would reject calls 
for modernizing Islam, finding their own answers in the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and 
' Abd al-Wahhab. They borrowed the idea of reforming society and returning to the 
fundamental practices of the golden age of the first generation (al-salaf al-salih). 
However, their worldview was also colored by the anticolonialist and nationalist 
sentiments of the time. In addition, many other Islamic jurists and intellectuals inspired 
the Islamic fundamentalist movement over the centuries, including al-Ghazzali, al-Farabi 
and Maududi. However, I believe that the core of modern fundamentalist ideology is 
contained in the writings and teachings of these outlined above. Together, the political 
philosophies of these five writers are essential to an understanding of modern 
fundamentalist movements in Islam. Many of the founding principles and core values of 
the Muslim Brotherhood are directly traceable to the writings of these men. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN EGYPT 
Throughout most of the twentieth century, Egypt has suffered sporadic bouts of 
internal violence caused by confrontations between the government and Islamic militants. 
The history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt can be characterized by long periods of 
an adversarial relationship with the government, characterized by repression and 
animosity with brief periods of cooperation. For the most part, the Brotherhood has been 
a nonviolent organization whose long-term goals revolve around bringing about gradual 
change by winning over the masses through social and educational programs. The stated 
goal of the Brotherhood is to first prepare the individual, then the society and eventually 
to achieve an Islamic state. Occasionally, the radical fringe of the organization has 
engaged in violent activities, but the organization has periodically purged these elements 
from its ranks. The Egyptian government's reaction to the Brotherhood has seemed 
entirely out of proportion and counter-productive in any attempt to promote peace and 
stability in Egypt. The government has feared the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood 
and sought to curb their successes. In a sense, the Egyptian government has been more 
concerned with their inability to control the message of the Muslim Brotherhood than 
3
 Ramadan, p. 157. 
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worried about the potential for violent radical rebellion stemming from governmental 
repression of a popular religious organization. 
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna in 1928. 
Initially it began as a movement for the reform of individual and social morality. It 
stressed three things: revival, organization and upbringing. The goal was to transform 
society into as close an approximation as possible to what the founder believed to be the 
original Islamic society established in Medina by the Prophet Muhammad in the 620s, 
there should be no distinction or barriers between religion and government. The Muslim 
Brotherhood soon expanded its goals to include challenging the secular leadership of all 
Muslim societies. Its strategy of change was to facilitate the emergence of a 'more 
Muslim' society through grassroots programs in education, charity, and social activities. 
The Brotherhood stressed the defensive definition of jihad and opposed violent or 
revolutionary tactics.3 4 
Over time, branches of the Muslim Brotherhood were founded in other Arab 
countries, including Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Kuwait, Syria and Jordan. However, 
despite the paranoid opinions of some writers, like Robert Baer the different branches 
are only loosely associated with each other and enjoy complete administrative 
independence. 
3 4
 Cook, p . 98 . 
3 5
 Robert Baer. Sleeping With the Devil (New York: Crown, 2003) . 
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The Early History of the Brotherhood 
The Muslim Brotherhood's humble origins date from 1928, when six workers 
employed by the British, in the Suez Canal Zone in Egypt, approached a young 
schoolteacher named Hasan al-Banna and asked him to become their leader. They had 
heard him preach in mosques and coffee-houses on the need for a revitalization and 
renewal of Islam. al-Banna accepted, and the Society of the Muslim Brothers was 
established.3 6 al-Banna and his followers began by starting an evening school. In its first 
few years, the Brotherhood initially resembled an ordinary Islamic welfare society, 
focusing on Islamic education, with an emphasis on teaching students how to implement 
into their daily lives an ethos of solidarity and charity, rather than on philosophical issues. 
The Muslim Brotherhood grew quickly. In 1931 there were three branches, and by 
1938 there were three hundred throughout Egypt: It had thus developed into a major 
political opposition group with a highly diverse membership and widespread mass 
37 
appeal. al-Banna's vision of renewing broken links between tradition and modernity 
enabled the Brotherhood to gain a degree of popularity and influence enjoyed by no other 
welfare society. Furthermore, al-Banna felt that the ideas of Islamic religious reformers 
and religious education were no longer accessible to the general public, especially young 
people. He was determined to rectify this by training a group of young, motivated 
preachers equipped with modern teaching methods who would be independent both of the 
government and of the religious establishment. In this environment we can observe the 
3 6
 Lia, p . 36 . 
3 7
 Mitchell , pp . 12-13. 
j 8
 Lia, pp. 53-57 . 
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enabled the Brotherhood to gain a degree of popularity and influence enjoyed by no other 
welfare society. Furthermore, al-Banna felt that the ideas of Islamic religious reformers 
and religious education were no longer accessible to the general public, especially young 
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Muslim Brotherhood acting in vocal opposition to the Egyptian government. It 
advocated widespread social and political reform but restricted itself to its social welfare 
programs and its preaching. As long as the government allowed the Brotherhood to 
operate and did not restrict its access to a forum from which it could express its views to 
the public, it remained peaceful and generally followed the law. 
The Brotherhood's first major project was the construction of a mosque, which 
was completed in 1931. They began to receive favorable attention in the press, and a 
Cairo branch was founded. In 1932, al-Banna was transferred to Cairo at his request, and 
the organization's headquarters moved there. 3 9 In the early 1930s, the Brotherhood's 
welfare activities included small-scale social work among the poor, building and 
repairing mosques, and establishing a number of Qur'anic schools. Members also set up 
small workshops and factories, and organized the collection and distribution of the alms 
tax. As the organization expanded it opened pharmacies, hospitals and clinics for the 
general public, and launched an adult literacy program, offering courses in coffee shops 
and clubs. 4 0 
In 1931-32, the Brotherhood underwent an internal crisis in the course of which 
several members challenged al-Banna's leadership decisions, particularly his control over 
the organization's funds, his general stubbornness, and his insistence on having a 
carpenter as his deputy. This conflict reflected a more basic disagreement with al-
Banna's concept of the Brotherhood's mission. Some members felt that the Brotherhood 
3 9
 Ibid., pp. 40-42 . 
4 0
 Ibid., pp. 109-111. 
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should simply be a traditional Islamic welfare society which wealthy local notables could 
support, meaning in particular that it should have open and transparent accounts and 
socially respectable leaders. al-Banna threatened to expel his enemies from the 
Brotherhood, at which point they resigned. 1 
In an effort to resolve the situation, al-Banna sought to clearly define the structure 
of the leadership in the organization. In the mid-1930s the Brotherhood developed a 
formal hierarchical structure, with the General Guide (al-Banna) at the top, assisted by a 
General Guidance Bureau and a deputy. Local branches were organized into districts, 
whose administration was largely autonomous. Categories of membership were 
introduced as well. Membership fees depended on the means of each member, with poor 
members paying no fees. Promotion through the hierarchy depended on the performance 
of Islamic duties and on knowledge attained in the Brotherhood's study groups. This 
merit-based system was a radical departure from the traditional practice of basing 
hierarchies on social status. 
In 1933, the Brotherhood founded a publishing company and purchased a printing 
press, which it used to print several newspapers over the next decade. Funds were raised 
by creating a joint stock company in which only members of the Brotherhood were 
permitted to buy shares, thus protecting the organization's independence from the 
government and from the wealthy elite by guaranteeing that its members were the sole 
owners of its institutions, and that they alone financed new projects.4 3 
4 1
 I b i d , pp. 60-67 . 
4 2
 I b i d , pp. 98-104 . 
4 3
 I b i d , pp. 97 -98 . 
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al-Banna began to emphasize the Brotherhood's political responsibilities 
concerning a variety of issues such as prostitution, alcohol, gambling, inadequate 
religious education in schools, and the struggle against imperialism. This political 
involvement attracted large numbers of young, educated Egyptians, particularly students, 
to the Brotherhood by encouraging and supporting them in campaigning for political 
44 
causes. 
The Brotherhood became the standard bearer of the ideology of the 
disenfranchised classes, the voice of the educated middle and lower middle classes, and 
the conduit through which many members of those groups demanded political 
participation. Throughout the 1930s the Brotherhood placed increasing emphasis on 
social justice, and closing the gap between the classes became one of its main objectives. 
al-Banna voiced increasingly strong criticisms of the upper class and the class system as a 
whole 
Islam is equal for all people and prefers nobody to others on the grounds of 
differences in blood or race, forefathers or descent, poverty or wealth. According to 
Islam everyone is equal... However, in deeds and natural gifts, then the answer is yes. 
The learned is above the ignorant... Thus, we see that Islam does not approve of the 
class system. 5 
The Brotherhood called for the nationalization of key industries, and for 
government intervention in the economy. It encouraged laws to protect workers against 
exploitation, supported social welfare programs, including unemployment benefits, 
public housing and health and adult literacy programs, which would be funded by higher 
taxes on the wealthy. By 1948 the Brotherhood was advocating land reform to enable 
4 4
 I b id , pp. 57-58 , 67-69 , 183-184. 
4 5
 I b i d , pp. 73-74. 
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small farmers to own land. al-Banna was attempting to bring about social renewal 
through a modern reinterpretation of Islam, arguing that religion should not be confined 
to the domain of private life, but should rather be applied to the problems of the modern 
world. Essentially, he believed that Islam should be used as the moral foundation of a 
national renaissance with a total reform of political, economic and social systems. 
The Brotherhood's openness to different forms of Islamic belief and practice 
represented another aspect of its appeal to young people. al-Banna condemned the rigid 
preoccupation of some Salaflyya societies with minor points of religious doctrine, and 
advocated tolerance and goodwill between the different forms and sects of Islam. Recent 
scholarly work even suggests that Hasan al-Bana and the Muslim Brotherhood accepted 
the validity of Shi'ism in Iran.4 8 He felt that Sufism and other traditional practices 
should be welcomed, and that the Brotherhood should focus on basic social and political 
issues rather than on theological hair-splitting.4 9 
Militancy and World War II 
In the late 1930s, some members pushed for the Muslim Brotherhood to form a 
military wing to conduct armed struggle against British rule. Others were already 
disobeying the Brotherhood's leadership and had engaged in isolated clashes with the 
police. al-Banna felt that the Brotherhood was not ready to engage in military activities, 
4 6
 Lia., pp. 73-74, 81-82, 206-211 and Carre , pp. 45-47 . 
4 7 L i a , , pp . 74-77 . 
4 8
 Abbas K h a m m a Yar Iran wa al-Ikhwan al-Miislimun—Dirasatfi 'Awamil al-ltifaq wa al-lftiraq (Beirut: 
Markaz al-Dirasaat al-Istratijiyyah wa a l -Buhuth w a al-Tawthiq, 1998) 
4 9
 Lia, pp. 59-60, 114-117. 
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and feared that those who wished to do so "might take the wrong course and miss the 
target." He advocated a more cautious, long-term plan of forming groups of particularly 
dedicated members, called "battalions" who would receive rigorous spiritual and physical 
training: Once their numbers were sufficient, al-Banna felt, the Battalions might be 
prepared to engage in warfare. However, the battalion system failed to develop 
satisfactorily, and pressure from members for armed struggle against the British 
increased. In 1939, conflict over this issue developed into a major crisis, during which 
some of the more extreme members left the Brotherhood to form a rival organization 
called the Youth of Muhammad. The following year the Brotherhood created a military 
wing called the secret apparatus.5 0 Later, in 1941 the elected General Assembly was 
replaced by a smaller appointed body called the Consultative Assembly. However, the 
Society's structure remained decentralized, so that branches could continue to operate if 
the government arrested leading members.5 1 
During the Second World War the Brotherhood adopted the position that Egypt 
should remain neutral. In 1941 Britain replaced the Egyptian government with a puppet 
regime, martial law was imposed, and some public figures that Britain considered 
subversive were arrested. al-Banna was imprisoned twice but was quickly released. The 
Brotherhood's publications were suppressed, its meetings were banned and any reference 
to the organization in the newspapers was forbidden.5 2 In the course of the war, the 
Brotherhood alternated between avoiding sensitive issues that could give the government 
5 0
 Lia, pp . 172-178 and Carre , pp . 30 -31 . 
5 1
 Lia, pp. 186-192. 
5 2
 Mitchell , pp. 19-23. 
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an excuse to crack down on the organization, and taking risky political positions such as 
calling for the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. While it generally kept a low 
profile, the Brotherhood concentrated on maintaining and expanding its membership base 
and extending its social welfare programs, which included helping the victims of Axis 
bombings of Egyptian cities. 
War-related shortages contributed to political unrest in Egypt. In February 1942, a 
mass demonstration of students led to the resignation of the government. British troops 
surrounded the royal palace and forced the king to accept a government headed by the 
Wafd party, which had remained loyal and obedient to the British throughout the war. 3 3 
The first act of the Wafd government was to dissolve parliament and call for new 
elections. When al-Banna declared his candidacy, the Wafd prime minister asked him to 
withdraw it; he agreed, but in return he obtained the prime minister's promise that the 
Brotherhood could resume its normal activities without governmental interference. Also, 
the government would enact measures to curtail prostitution and the sale of alcohol. The 
government did make prostitution illegal, and restricted the sale of alcohol on religious 
holidays. The Brotherhood was allowed to resume some of its work, but over the next 
few years the government's attitude alternated between repression and friendliness 
towards the organization.5 4 As a result of sporadic repression, the call for violent action 




 Mitchell , pp . 26 -28 . 
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radicalization of the organization emerged within the Brotherhood in response to the 
government's attempts to limit its exposure to the public. 
The Brotherhood then reorganized itself into a system of cells in order to 
minimize the impact of arrests on the membership. In 1943, the Society replaced its failed 
battalion system with a cellular form of internal organization called "families" which 
consisted of groups of five members. The families met regularly, usually in their own 
homes, and assumed responsibility for one another's welfare.5 5 Similar organizational 
structures have proven to be extremely successful when employed by guerrilla and 
insurgency groups around the world throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
Postwar 
During the postwar years the Brotherhood grew rapidly, and by 1948 had two 
thousand branches with over a million members.3 6 In September 1945 it adopted a new 
constitution that formally recognized the structures and organization put in place during 
the 1938 reorganization mentioned above. It also submitted its records to the Ministry of 
Social Affairs as was required by law, and was classified as a "political, social and 
religious institution" but did not receive legal recognition as a political party. Basically, 
this meant that government assistance given to charities would be available for some of 
the Brotherhood's activities but that its legal status was dependent upon the whims of the 
government. Therefore the social welfare programs were divided into separate sections, 
5 5
 Lia, pp. 256-266 , 176-177. 
5 6
 Carre , p . 2 1 . 
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each with its own director and structure, in order to protect them from governmental 
interference.3 7 
al-Banna and several other Brotherhood candidates were defeated in the rigged 
elections of 1945. The Brotherhood's publications expressed hostility and criticism 
towards the government and its policies, and it organized strikes and nationalist 
demonstrations. In October 1945, the Society organized a "people's congress" on national 
liberation in Cairo and seven other cities. Its exclusion from parliamentary politics 
strengthened the position of those members who advocated a more radical and violent 
confrontation with the government. By this time many were becoming increasingly 
• 58 
dismissive of al-Banna's policy of nonviolent action. 
The Muslim Brotherhood had arrived at a point where there was considerable risk 
of its stated goals of gradual societal change evolving into a call for violent revolution. 
al-Banna's concept of nationalism was Islamic in origin, and its long-term goal was to see 
all humanity united by the Muslim faith. On the other hand the Brotherhood had no clear 
definition of the sort of political system it wished for. The primary consequence of the 
Brotherhood's affirmation of Islamic nationalism was its support of the anticolonial 
movement in Egypt and other Islamic countries before World War II and 
anticommunism after the war. 
The Brotherhood was also vehemently against the existing social order and the 
government that supported it, which was one of the main reasons for its popularity, 
" M i t c h e l l , pp . 36-37 . 
5 8
 Ibid., p . 3 3 . 
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especially among young people.* However, government attempts to suppress and 
marginalize the Muslim Brotherhood seemingly backfired and, in effect, nearly created a 
violent revolutionary movement. 
After the fall of the Wafd party from power in 1945, the Brotherhood and the 
Wafd became the two main opposition parties in the political arena. Out of power, the 
Wafd was more eager to champion the nationalist cause, with the result that the 
Brotherhood found itself in direct competition with the Wafd for the leadership of the 
Egyptian nationalist movement. However, the communists chose to support the Wafd. 
Despite their deep mutual distrust, the two groups occasionally joined in the same mass 
demonstrations against the government. However, the Brotherhood's refusal to cooperate 
with the communists led to the breakdown of relations between the two groups. The 
Wafd party accused the Brothers of being tools of the government and of the ruling class 
while it alone represented the masses. The Brothers took offense at these accusations, and 
organized competing strikes of their own. This further damaged their already poor 
relationship with the government, and the Brotherhood again became the target of police 
harassment and summary arrests.6 0 
In 1946, al-Banna was nearly killed by a bomb attack, suspected of being carried 
out by Wafd supporters. Tensions continued to escalate and followers of the Wafd party 
and members of the Brotherhood had a series of violent encounters. After these clashes, 
representatives of the Brotherhood and the Wafd party held secret meetings in order to 
5 9
 Lia, pp. 7 9 - 8 1 . 
6 0
 Mitchell , pp . 42-49 . 
  59  
    ir  t,  
  
r      
      
      
  lf    
    
   
  '  l 
     
      t   
   
       
      
t  rests.60
   
     
      r 
      
59 i , . . 
60 i  
46 
alleviate the tension between the two groups.6 1 The ability of these rival organizations to 
disrupt the peace and mobilize the population did not go unnoticed by the government. 
The government's reaction would be more repression and tighter control of the political 
currents in Egypt. 
In October 1946, the Egyptian Prime Minister, Sidqi Pasha, and the British 
reached agreement on a draft treaty according to which the British agreed to evacuate 
Cairo, Alexandria, and the Nile Delta by March 31,1947 and the rest of Egypt by 
September 1, 1949. The government agreed that in case of aggression by any of Egypt's 
neighbors, the British would be allowed back to their former bases in Suez and the 
Egyptians would cooperate with them as they had done during World War II. These pro-
British terms were unacceptable to many Egyptian nationalists, and their announcement 
was followed by violent student riots. Members of the Brotherhood's secret apparatus 
started to carry out attacks on British interests as well as on targets related to the Egyptian 
government. The government responded to the outbreak of violence with harsh and 
repressive measures, including arresting many members of the Brotherhood and other 
nationalist groups. Rioting continued throughout 1946, and in December the government 
62 
resigned. ~ However, the postwar global political environment quickly became a major 
focus of regional policy. 
In Egypt and across the Arab world, the plight of the Palestinian people continued 




 Ibid., pp. 49-50 , 60. 
  ups.61   
   
'      
  
 t  t    
  , 19    
 t      
      
     
    
     '   
     
t    
     
    
resigned. However, the postwar global political environment quickly became a major 
focus of regional policy. 
In Egypt and across the Arab world, the plight of the Palestinian people continued 
to outrage people. The 1947 UN resolution on the partitioning of Palestine gave the issue 
61 I i . 
62 
47 
a sense of urgency, and the Brotherhood sent volunteers to fight in the 1948 Arab-Israeli 
War. During the war, there were numerous bomb attacks on Jews in Cairo, many of 
which were attributed to members of the Brotherhood's Secret Apparatus. 3 In March 
1948, members of the secret apparatus assassinated a judge who had given a prison 
sentence to a Muslim Brother for attacking British soldiers. al-Banna expressed his 
revulsion at the assassination,6 4 but the violence of the secret apparatus demonstrated 
that Hasan al-Bana and the core of the Muslim Brotherhood was losing control of its 
members. The decentralized structure of the organization allowed for independent 
operations to be carried out by individual cells. However, without direct logistical 
control, the leadership could only influence its members and hope for the best. As 
tensions and repression on the part of the government escalated, so did the violence. 
In December 1948, the Egyptian government released a decree outlawing the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The police had discovered stockpiles of bombs and other weapons 
accumulated by the secret apparatus, and the government feared, or purported to fear, that 
the Brotherhood was planning a revolution. Also, since the Brotherhood had its own 
infrastructure in the form of hospitals, factories and schools, as well as an armed military 
force, the government saw it potentially developing into a parallel state, which some 
Egyptians might come to see as more legitimate than the official one. A few weeks 
later, with the organization's hierarchy and communications thoroughly disrupted 
because of the arrests, a member of the Brotherhood assassinated Prime Minister 
6 3
 Ibid., pp. 55 -58 . 
6 4
 Ibid., pp. 62 . 
6 5
 Ibid., pp. 58-66 . 
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Nuqrashi. Several trials followed, and Nuqrashi's assassin was executed. The prosecution 
attempted to demonstrate that al-Banna had been responsible for the assassination, while 
the defense argued that he had been unable to maintain control over "extremists" in the 
secret apparatus. In the end he was exonerated.6 6 
The new prime minister, ' Abd al-Hadi, attempted to suppress all dissent by 
subjecting the population to brutal repressive measures, including the systematic use of 
torture against political prisoners. 6 7 al-Banna again rejected all the accusations leveled at 
the Brotherhood. Once more he condemned the use of violence by Brotherhood 
members, including attacks on Jews, declaring that the leaders of the organization would 
never have sanctioned this violence, and were unable to prevent it because the arrest of 
the leaders had made it impossible for them to exercise their authority. He also denied 
that the Brotherhood had been planning to overthrow the government, insisting that the 
stockpiles of weapons had been intended for use in Palestine in open partnership with the 
Arab League. 
In February 1949, probably on the orders of the prime minister, the political 
police assassinated al-Banna.6 8 However, the gradual escalation of repression and 
reprisals by the government did not put an end to the Brotherhood as it had originally 
intended. Instead, it encouraged members to radicalize and join the more extreme 
elements of the organization that advocated violent opposition to the government. As 
control of the Muslim Brotherhood began to slip away from the leadership, due in large 
6 6
 Ibid., pp. 72-74. 
6 7
 Ibid., pp. 68-69 . 
6 8
 Carre , p . 3 3 , and Mitchell , pp. 7 0 - 7 1 . 
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part to the imprisonment of the leaders, the violence increased. Rather than handicapping 
the organization, this allowed the more radical elements of the Brotherhood to act with 
greater impunity. 
In May 1949, following a series of arrests of Brotherhood members, a group of 
Brothers made an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate prime minister 'Abd al-Hadi, which 
sparked yet more arrests. By July, more than four thousand members of the Brotherhood 
were in prison. While in prison they continued to maintain their organization and 
hierarchy.6 9 
When the Wafd returned to power in 1950 the Brotherhood attempted to have the 
government give recognition to the Muslim Brotherhood again, but this was 
unsuccessful. Martial law was ended, and all its provisions were suspended except with 
regard to the Brotherhood. The Parliament passed a "Societies Law" that was clearly 
aimed at the Brotherhood, requiring a description and photograph of every member to be 
registered with the government. The Ministry of the Interior announced that it intended to 
buy the Muslim Brotherhood's headquarters in Cairo and use the building as a police 
station. The Brotherhood responded by filing a lawsuit against the government and 
actually won, thus reacquiring its legal status and its property. 
Mitchell , p. 80 . 
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The 1952 Egyptian Revolution 
In 1951, an outsider, Hasan Isma'il al-Hudaybi, an experienced judge known for 
his strong aversion to violence, was chosen as al-Banna's successor. It was believed that 
he could reestablish the Muslim Brotherhood's respectability and legitimacy which had 
been tarnished as a result of the political violence of the late 1940s. He struggled against 
being treated as a mere figurehead and actively spoke out against the secret apparatus and 
its violent tactics. He attempted to dissolve it, but only managed to alienate its members, 
who considered themselves fighters in a noble cause.7 1 
On 8 October 1951 the Egyptian prime minister withdrew Egypt from the Anglo-
Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which immediately triggered mass nationalist demonstrations in 
favor of Egyptian independence. Over the next few months, antigovernment riots broke 
out all over the country, expressing the nationalist movement's frustration with the 
government's failure to follow up its actions with more vigorous efforts to achieve actual 
independence. On 25 January 1952, British forces attacked an Egyptian police station in 
the Canal Zone and a battle occurred. The next day, students in Cairo, police and military 
officers marched together to the parliament to demand a declaration of war against 
Britain. 
al-Hudaybi maintained his opposition to violent action and deepened the conflict 
between himself and his opponents within the organization and the secret apparatus. 
Several new governments followed and fell in rapid succession. Then, on July 23, 1952 
the Free Officers, led by Muhammad Naguib, seized power, overthrowing the monarchy. 
7 1
 Mitchell , pp . 82-88 . 
 
     
    
   '    
    
   
   
  use.71 
      
        
     t 
    '    
    t  
   
 
rs        
      
lf  
   
,    
71 i
51 
This largely bloodless coup was greeted with enormous enthusiasm throughout Egypt. 
The Brotherhood did not participate in the coup, or its aftermath, as an organization but 
had agreed to assist the revolution, mostly by maintaining order, protecting foreigners 
73 
and minorities and encouraging popular support for the coup. 
After the revolution, relations between the Brotherhood and the new government 
rapidly deteriorated. Many members of the Free Officers, including Gamal 'Abd al-
Nasser and Anwar al-Sadat, had had close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood since the 
1940s. However, there was a deep animosity and distrust between Nasser and al-
Hudaybi. Furthermore, the new government was unwilling to share power and did not 
want to have a constitution based on Islam. 
In 1953, the government banned all political parties and organizations except the 
Muslim Brotherhood. It then created a new party, the Liberation Rally, and suggested that 
the Brotherhood should merge with the Liberation Rally. The government was 
attempting to marginalize the Brotherhood without sharing any real political power with 
it. 7 4 Despite strong criticisms from within the Brotherhood, al-Hudaybi retained control 
and had the secret apparatus formally dissolved and its leaders expelled from the 
organization.7 5 This demonstrates the extent of the commitment of the Brotherhood 
leadership to nonviolence and its willingness to cooperate with the secular government 
provided that it was allowed to maintain a public space in which to operate legally. 
7 1
 Mitchell , pp . 88-96 . 
7 3
 Ibid., pp. 96-104 . 
7 4
 Ibid., 106-111 . 
7 5
 Ibid., pp. 116-125. 
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In January 1954, the government sent members of the Liberation Rally to disrupt 
a Muslim Brotherhood student rally, and the confrontation turned violent. The 
government then decreed that the Muslim Brotherhood should be dissolved because al-
Hudaybi and his supporters were planning to overthrow it, and al-Hudaybi was arrested 
along with hundreds of others. This use of severe and repressive measures to maintain 
power, which was perceived as Nasser's policy, caused the government's popularity to 
plummet. There were anti-Nasser demonstrations, which led to a power struggle between 
him and General Naguib. al-Hudaybi sided with Nasser and with the revolution, gaining 
the release of most of the imprisoned Brothers and, once more, the restoration of the 
Brotherhood's legal status. However, the government repression of January had disturbed 
many members who felt that the secret apparatus should not have been abolished so 
* • 76 
quickly, and it was rebuilt under a new leadership without al-Hudaybi's knowledge. 
This situation demonstrates that members of the Muslim Brotherhood were willing to use 
violent tactics when the government denied them access to a public forum. Repressive 
measures, including the jailing of the leadership, did not silence the organization, but 
only radicalized it. It also unintentionally removed the strongest voices for nonviolence 
in the organization. 
If the government had permitted the Brotherhood to remain as a political 
opposition group, it would have legitimized the whole political process which it had 
initially put in motion. Instead, it attempted, first, to co-opt the organization and when 
that failed, to dismantle it. The result was the temporary loss of public support for the 
7 6
 Ibid., pp. 126-134. 
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government and the revitalization and encouragement of the wing of the Brotherhood 
which advocated greater radicalization. 
In a letter to the government, al-Hudaybi called for the lifting of martial law, a 
return to parliamentary democracy and an end to censorship of the media. Relations 
between the government and the Brotherhood fell apart again after the latter criticized the 
terms of the negotiations between the British and the Egyptian government over the Suez 
Canal. After an agreement on the terms of a new treaty was announced, al-Hudaybi 
immediately criticized it as too generous towards the British and as a threat to Egyptian 
sovereignty. Accordingly, the government began using the police to provoke violent 
confrontation with the Brotherhood at peaceful gatherings in mosques and other places. 
A clinic run by the Brotherhood was raided and destroyed, and the government blamed 
the Brotherhood for the violence. al-Hudaybi went into hiding, and the state-run press 
launched a propaganda campaign to discredit him. The government also declared that 
several Brothers who were traveling abroad were guilty of treason, and stripped them of 
their Egyptian citizenship.7 7 
The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed on 19 October 1954. Members of the new 
Secret Apparatus saw the treaty as a betrayal of Egypt and decided to act independently. 
On 26 October, a member of the secret apparatus allegedly fired shots at Nasser while he 
was making a speech. There is some evidence that Nasser and his close associates may 
have staged the assassination attempt themselves. Regardless of the truth of this 
allegation, the attempt on his life gave a huge boost to Nasser's popularity and enabled 
7 7
 Mitchell, pp. 134-144. 
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him to prevail in his power struggle with General Naguib. It also gave him the perfect 
opportunity to eliminate the Brotherhood. The organization was officially dissolved, its 
headquarters burned, and thousands of its members were arrested. Large show-trials with 
little regard for due process of law were held. Six Brotherhood members were executed, 
78 
and seven, including al-Hudaybi, were sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor. 
The Nasser Years 
Throughout Nasser's presidency many members of the Muslim Brotherhood were 
held in prisons that were barely more than concentration camps. While imprisoned they 
were routinely tortured. Some died in custody, including twenty-one Brothers killed in 
their cells in June 1957. Those who escaped arrest went into hiding. Sayyid Qutb, the 
former editor of the Society's newspaper, became the leader of the Brothers held in prison 
and became the organization's General Guide in 1959. Qutb was the quintessential 
Islamic fundamentalist who encouraged the radicalization of the movement. Essentially, 
the consequence of the large-scale repressions by the Nasser's government was to push 
the Muslim Brotherhood towards a more radical form of fundamentalism that advocated 
7Q 
armed struggle rather than social reform. 
Those Brothers who had gone underground began to reorganize. In 1956, those 
who had been imprisoned but not judged were released.8 0 Outside the prisons, Zaynab al-
Ghazali, head of the Association of Muslim Women, played a key role in rebuilding the 
7 8
 Mitchell, pp. 144-160 and Carre, pp. 59-63. 
7 9
 Cook, pp. 102-06. 
8 0
 Carre, pp. 65-76, 83-86. 
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organization. She had been a member of the Brotherhood since the late 1940s and 
• 81 • 
maintained contact with the imprisoned leadership. Her focus was on Islamic 
education, but other autonomous groups of Brothers also began to organize. They found 
their analytical framework and political agenda in Qutb's writings, which were circulated 
by al-Ghazali. Qutb's writings included Social Justice in Islam, which set out the 
principles of an Islamic socialism and his assessment of the Nasser regime, and how it 
could be overcome. In 1964, Qutb was released for several months, and his book 
Milestones was published. In it he argued the theme of the failure of both capitalism and 
socialism. Qutb saw Islam as the solution to humanity's predicament: The entire world, 
including Egypt, was living in a state of jahiliyya, roughly translated as a way of life 
characterized by ignorant hostility towards God's will. In particular, human beings erred 
in allowing themselves to establish their own value systems, instead of accepting God's 
sovereignty (hakimiyya). According to Qutb, a true Muslim society must reject all laws 
and traditions made by humans. Therefore, modern Islamic societies were in reality 
unbelievers (kafir), a view which clearly deviated from the ideology of Hasan al-Banna 
and the original core principles of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
A core of believers was needed to begin recreating the ummah. This vanguard 
would then grow until it encompassed the entire world. Confronted by a totalitarian state, 
11




 Cook, p. 103. 
' The conventional usage o f the word describes the 'time o f ignorance' before the coming of Islam. 
1 5
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Qutb urged them to prepare a jihad, whose military objectives were aimed at the 
overthrow of those who had usurped the sovereignty that should be God's alone. 
Milestones sparked a debate within the Brotherhood between young activists who 
favored radical, violent action in the form of an immediate coup, while more experienced 
members such as Zaynab al-Ghazali, believed that the organization should follow the 
example set by Hasan al-Bana and limit itself to educational work until it had three 
quarters of the population on its side. This policy, which has been a characteristic of 
the official policy of the Brotherhood ever since, has earned it the scorn of more extreme 
revolutionary Islamic fundamentalist militant groups. 
In August 1965, the government claimed to have discovered that the Brotherhood 
was organizing a huge revolutionary plot. Roughly 18, 000 people were arrested, 
including Qutb and al-Ghazali. One hundred to two hundred were imprisoned, and thirty-
eight were killed in custody during the investigation. The police used torture and coercion 
during the interrogations. Raids throughout Egypt were accompanied by an intense 
propaganda campaign against the Brotherhood. Based on confessions obtained under 
89 
torture, Qutb and two other Brothers were executed in August 1966. In the 1970s, it 
emerged that the plot had been fabricated by the security services as part of a conflict 
between different factions within the regime.9 0 
8 7
 Carre, p. 76. 
8 8
 Voll , p. 373. 
8 9
"The trial [of Qutb and others in 1966] offered the accused all the guarantees of fairness characteristic of 
a military court in a dictatorial state trying defendants broken by torture." Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism 
in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1993, p. 
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The result of the government repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and other 
Islamic fundamentalist organizations was that it acted as a catalyst for the radicalization 
of the rhetoric emerging from the fundamentalist movement. Sayyid Qutb's advocacy of 
violent opposition to the government gained many supporters in the fundamentalist cause, 
both inside and outside prison. Following the release of most of the religious and 
political prisoners by 1971, the fundamentalist community had effectively been divided 
into two broad groups. The first followed the old established leadership of the 
Brotherhood that supported gradual social change over revolutionary confrontation. This 
group was headed by al-Hudaybi, who, while in prison, wrote Missionaries Not Judges, 
in refutation of the notion of takfir and the radical views expressed in Qutb's Milestones 
and other insurrectionist writings. 9 1 
The second group consisted of radicalized militant fundamentalists who 
advocated violent revolution in order to change Egypt into a 'true' Islamic state. An 
ironic consequence of the campaign of widespread arrests and detention of political and 
religious dissidents was that this actually provided the radical militants a fertile recruiting 
ground with a "captive" audience. Nonradicalized students who were members of 
student groups or Islamic organizations were thrown into the prisons with the hard-core 
leadership of the radicalized movements. The prisoners were allowed to socialize and 
mingle. The result was that prisons became education centers where the writings of Qutb 
and Mawdudi, an Indo-Pakistani Islamic fundamentalist writer, would be studied and 
discussed. It was not hard to convince the young and impressionable prisoners that a 
9 1
 Voll, p. 273 . 
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society that had established prison camps for pious Muslims and tortured and executed 
dissidents was a society in jahiliyya. What emerged from the prison camps was a new 
generation of radicalized Islamic fundamentalists who rejected cooperation with the 
government and were receptive to violent revolutionary tactics. Through their repressive 
tactics the Egyptian government had created a stronger and better-defined opposition 
movement, which posed a far larger threat to the safety and security of the regime than 
the Muslim Brotherhood had ever done. 
The Sadat Years 
In 1967 the Arab world was delivered a devastating defeat by Israel in the Six 
Day War. One of the consequences of this defeat was the gradual decline of support for 
the Pan-Arab and Arab-Socialist ideologies developed and supported by Nasser. In fact, 
many people throughout the Arab world viewed the defeat as punishment from God for 
straying too far from the true path of Islam. The population of the Arab world, including 
Egypt, began to reexamine its religious roots and to question the pervasive secularism 
that had been in vogue during the preceding decades. When Nasser died in 1970, his 
successor, Anwar Sadat, was faced with a reemergence of Islamic awareness in popular 
culture and civil society which was sympathetic to the expressed goals of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other moderate fundamentalist organizations. In addition, the 
2
 Ibid., p. 374. 
1 3
 Ibid., p. 376. 
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popularity of these organizations was further increased since they were providing many 
of the social services to the poor that the government failed to provide. 
In 1971 Anwar Sadat introduced a policy of economic and political liberalization. 
The concentration camps were closed, and the government began to release members of 
the Brotherhood from prison, although the organization remained illegal. In fact, the 
government tolerated the Brotherhood unofficially. It was allowed to resume printing 
various publications as well as establish new schools and mosques.9 4 The Brotherhood 
was allowed to publish its monthly newspaper, al-Da 'wa, and the identity of many 
members was public knowledge.9 5 With the moderate leadership firmly back in control, 
this lessening of the tensions between the government and the Muslim Brotherhood had 
some positive effects. The Brotherhood retreated from the jihadist rhetoric that had 
advocated violent insurrection and instead demanded the application of shari'a law. In 
response the government initiated a lengthy review of all Egyptian law to determine how 
best to combine it with shari'a. In 1980, the constitution was amended to state that the 
shari'a was "a principal source of legislation,"9 6 although not, as the radical 
fundamentalists wanted it, "the source of all legislation." 
Another goal of the Brotherhood was to persuade the government to allow it to 
operate legally again as a political party, but this was not allowed. The Political Parties 
Law of 1977 specifically prohibited parties based on religious affiliation, though as a 
Voll, p. 380. 
95 
Carrie Wickham. Mobilizing Islam ( N e w York: Columbia University Press, 2002) , 
pp. 65, 96 and Ramadan, pp. 165-66. 
9 6
 Carre, pp. 107-112 and Voll, p. 377. 
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concession Sadat appointed members of the Brotherhood to high positions in the ruling 
Center Party.9 7 
Sadat's primary goal in embracing the religious revival and tolerating the 
fundamentalists was to undermine the leftists and the remaining Nasserists in Egypt. 
Furthermore, the Brotherhood provided a moderate alternative to the radical takfir 
organizations. Hence the Brotherhood, with its intense hatred of communism, became 
the natural ally of the regime. Furthermore, by overtly aligning himself with the 
Brotherhood, Sadat was able to gain popular support to liberalize and privatize the 
Egyptian economy.9 8 In exchange, he had to concede to allow the popular fundamentalist 
organization access to civil society and allow it to play an active role in the ruling party. 
Sadat's economic policies were drastic and caused severe price increases for basic 
necessities while government-sponsored public services degraded, which led to huge riots 
in January 1977. Student religious and political groups began to exercise a great deal of 
influence outside universities as well. al-Da'wa supported the student Islamic movement, 
and leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were invited to speak at large, festive gatherings 
organized by student groups on Islamic holidays. When the government began to obstruct 
the student movement, and then to attack its members with riot police, the Brotherhood's 
relations with the government deteriorated as well. 9 9 
Ramadan, pp. 166-67. 
Voll , p. 377. 
Wickham, pp. 32-34, 115-117. 
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In the late 1970s and early 1980s the Brotherhood attempted to use its influence 
within the Islamic student movements to consolidate the groups under its leadership.1 0 0 
Independent of the student groups, Islamic groups outside the universities organized the 
Permanent Islamic Congress for the Propagation of Islam, and proceeded to elect al-
Talmasani, the leader of the Brotherhood since 1973, as leader of the organization.1 0 1 The 
Egyptian government viewed this as a threat, considering it indicative of the 
Brotherhood's intention to regain the political power that it had lost in 1954. 
Furthermore, the government preferred that the Islamic fundamentalist movement should 
remain fractured. They wished to deal with various organizations individually so that 
they could control them better and ensure that the Islamic groups were working towards 
the state's goals. Consolidation of the fundamentalists meant that rival organizations 
could no longer be played off against each other. Essentially, a consolidated 
fundamentalist movement would become a powerful social force that would be working 
to advance their own cause instead of being a tool of the government. 
Furthermore, Sadat had angered the fundamentalist organizations, especially the 
radicalized militants, by moving towards reconciliation with Israel. Most Egyptians had 
perceived the 1973 war as a victory and many had long regarded Israel as an illegitimate 
entity comprised of infidels that were repressing good Palestinian Muslims by occupying 
their land. According to many Islamic fundamentalists, including the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Islamic Congress, there could be no reconciliation with Israel. The 
1 0 0
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Camp David accords of 1978 were met by widespread condemnation throughout Egypt 
and were criticized by the Brotherhood in al-Da'm102 This political faux pas combined 
with the decline in Egypt's economic situation and the explosive growth of radical 
fundamentalist organizations following Nasser's ill-conceived crackdown on religious 
organizations proved to be a legacy that would continue to destabilize Sadat's regime.1 0 3 
The radical fundamentalist groups, forged in Nasser's prisons and educated on 
Qutb's writings, began to exercise more influence over Egyptian society. Their stated 
goal was to end jahiliyya and establish a truly Islamic society by destabilizing and 
overthrowing an "unbelieving government."1 0 4 While these radicalized militant groups 
were always fringe groups with relatively small numbers of followers, they played an 
important role in affecting Sadat's policies towards the fundamentalist organizations. 
New radicalized fundamentalist groups called for violence against the regime with 
the stated goal of overthrowing the atheist leadership and replacing it with an Islamic 
state. The first of these groups was the Military Technical College Organization headed 
by the Palestinian, Salih Adb Allah Siriyya. They believed that the biggest mistake of the 
Islamist movements of the past was the gradualist approach. Siriyya believed that they 
must seize control of the state and establish an Islamic society from the top down. 
A second group was the Society of Muslims. They believed in a course of 
emigration out of Egypt. They viewed Egypt as a land of atheism led by infidels. 
However, the emigration was only necessary in order to gather their forces for an 
1 0 2
 Ramadan, p. 168. 
1 0 3
 Voll, p. 377. 
1 0 4
 Voll, p. 381 . 
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offensive retaking of Egypt. Furthermore, the society of Muslims was willing to go a 
step further than other takfir groups and was willing to label everyone within the atheist 
society who does not actively fight against the regime as infidels and atheists as well. 
The society also engaged in kidnappings and assassinations of Egyptian officials. 
Perhaps the biggest takfir group to emerge during the Sadat regime was al-Jihad. 
al-Jihad emerged as a splinter group from Siriyya's organization. Led by Ahmed Salih 
Amer, this group was mostly comprised of radicalized university students. Their primary 
goal was to overthrow the state. The Egyptian government in 1977 essentially destroyed 
the group but it would continue to reform over the ensuing years. 
A final important takfir organization, headed by Muhammed Faraj would be 
responsible for the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, following the mass round-up 
and detention of political adversaries of the regime. According to Faraj, jihad had become 
a "neglected duty" among contemporary Muslims. This book was first published and 
distributed to students in Cairo in the early 1980s where it influenced an entire generation 
of youth. The Neglected Duty echoes Qutb on the need for a strategy that attacks the 
"near enemy"—apostate Muslim regimes—before the "far enemy" —meaning Israel, the 
United States, and other Western powers interfering in the Muslim world. Faraj also 
accused the Muslim Brothers and the establishment Egyptian clergy of collaborating with 
the secular Egyptian regime. 
Faraj argued that both the Qur'an and the Hadith were fundamentally about 
warfare or war in the service of God and in opposition to evil. The notion of jihad, or 
struggle, is something Muslims should accept literally. It is not simply about struggle for 
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personal piety but rather struggle for Islam against God's enemies. Muslims are called to 
be soldiers for Islam, and true soldiers of Islam are willing to use any means available in 
order to achieve their righteous goals. The reward would be paradise itself. In heaven for 
the martyrs and on earth for the living once a true Islamic state was established over the 
entire human population. 
Faraj and his followers believed that by killing Sadat, or Pharoh, it would spark a 
widespread uprising against the regime. The group was destroyed when the uprising it 
anticipated failed to materialize. It was the last serious takfir group to exist solely in 
Egypt. However, al Jama al Islamiyya would succeed al Jihad. Founded by the remnants 
of al Jihad, including Umar Abd al- Rahman, Jama embraced takfir as part of a wider 
strategy that extended beyond just Egypt. While they would label a society Jahilliyya, 
they would acknowledge that individuals could be Muslim despite the poor state of 
society. Jama rejected the democratic experiment as un-Islamic and they wished to 
model society after the caliphate. By the late 1980s Jama would engage in violent 
skirmishes with the Egyptian authorities. Though they declared a cease fire and officially 
renounced violence in 1999, their former leader, Abd al Rahman is currently serving a 
life sentence for his role as mastermind of the first World Trade Center bombing. 
These radical organizations were the legacy of the repressive measures enacted by 
the government. While the Muslim Brotherhood, having been allowed a public role and 
forum in which to operate, rejected violence. Under the new leadership of 'Umar al-
Talmasani the Brotherhood clearly defined its position vis-a-vis the Egyptian 
government. The Brotherhood did not wish to rule nor was it concerned with those who 
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ruled: rather, it was concerned with the form of rule or the constitution and the laws that 
governed society. Violence only undermined the fabric of society and strengthened the 
enemies of Egypt. 1 ( b 
In response to the violence of the takfir groups and the increasing influence of 
moderate fundamentalist organizations with civil society, Sadat's regime attempted to 
exert more control over religious institutions. As fundamentalist organizations became 
more vocal in their opposition to Sadat's modernist policies, he attempted to establish a 
non-fundamentalist alternative. 
In effect, Sadat wanted to create a "civil religion" headed by a "Believing 
President," 1 0 6 but his efforts met with little real success. Although he promoted the 
image of a pious Islamic leader, his regime worked behind the scenes to suppress the 
fundamentalist opposition groups. At this point Sadat could probably have co-opted the 
whole of the fundamentalist movement and gained the support of a large portion of the 
population if he had openly allied himself with the moderate fundamentalists. Legal 
recognition of the Muslim Brotherhood and a couple of key cabinet positions could have 
established the Muslim Brotherhood as a loyal opposition. It might well have relieved 
the tension between the government and the people that was pervasive throughout 
Egyptian society and could have pulled support away from the radicalized militant 
organizations. Instead, Sadat chose to emulate Nasser and ordered the arrests of 
thousands of Islamic fundamentalists in 1981. He essentially lumped all the moderate 
1 0 5
 Ramadan, p. 168. 
1 0 6
 Voll, p. 378. 
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and peaceful organizations in Egypt, including the Islamic Congress, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and student groups, with the takfir groups. Instead of recognizing that the 
Brotherhood could use its leadership role to influence the fundamentalist community to 
use nonviolent tactics, he focused repressive measures on the Brotherhood, effectively 
removing the only major check on the radical militant groups. The militant groups 
viewed this as a last straw and while this crack down was taking place, a member of al-
Jihad assassinated Sadat in October of 1981. 
The Brotherhood consistently rejected the revolutionary and terrorist violence of 
the militant Islamic groups such as al-Jihad. It continued to follow the leadership of al-
Hubaydi and al-Ghazali that had called for the gradual reorientation and Islamization of 
society. At the same time, it argued that increasingly brutal police persecution was 
largely to blame for this escalation. It asserted that if the Brotherhood were to be 
legalized it would be able to help combat radical extremism by providing Islamic 
education to young people. Instead, while his popularity was plummeting, Sadat ordered 
arrests among all opposition groups, including the Brotherhood. The arrested members 
of the Brotherhood were released in January 1982, never having been charged with any 
crimes. 1 0 8 
Sadat's inability to achieve a modern and moderate Islamic political culture that 
could be a state-sponsored alternative to more radical fundamentalism provoked a 
Ramadan, p. 172. 
Wickham, pp. 65-66. 
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backlash against his 'reforms'. As his reforms became increasingly unpopular, so did his 
vision of a modern and moderate Islam led by a "Believing President." 
This situation meant that the Islamic fundamentalist alternative promoted by the 
opposition gained popularity at the government's expense. Furthermore, by opening the 
door to the opposition by allowing it to participate in public discourse when he was trying 
to gain its support for his economic policies, Sadat had legitimized the opposition's 
participation in civil society. He could not claim to be the leader of an Islamic nation if 
he attempted to suppress the message of the popular fundamentalist organizations. 
Furthermore, he could never gain the popular support of the people while he was 
perceived to be attacking civil society. 
Hence when the fundamentalists began to turn against his regime, Sadat found his 
options limited. Rather than exploring a path of compromise that could have 
marginalized the radical militant opposition in favor of the moderates, he resorted to 
repression. This repression prevented the Muslim Brotherhood from being able to exert 
its influence over the more radical groups and ultimately motivated a radicalized militant 
group to assassinate him. 
The Mubarak Years 
Under the rule of Husni Mubarak, Egypt has been surprisingly stable. While 
Nasser had ruled with his force of personality and Sadat had led by flamboyant excesses, 
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Mubarak has maintained a quiet and steady leadership where most policies were 
implemented behind the scenes. 1 0 9 
While Nasser and Sadat failed to distinguish any differences among the various 
religiously motivated opposition groups and tended to engage in a wholesale suppression 
of Islamists, Mubarak and his advisors were able to separate the handful of violent 
revolutionary organizations from the mainstream religious organizations that were 
promoting nonviolent methods of achieving an Islamic state. 1 1 0 
During the 1980s Mubarak's government continued the policy of identifying itself 
as one of the primary Islamic institutions in society. They also continued efforts to 
control the message of Islamists by suppressing the more radical groups and co-opting 
the message of the moderates.1 1 1 In a marked change from the tactics employed by his 
predecessor, Mubarak narrowly focused the repressive activities of the state only on those 
individuals and organizations that were already violent or represented direct threats to the 
state such as al-Jihad, which had been responsible for the assassination of Sadat. He also 
released most of those arrested in 1981 during the widespread roundup of Islamists 
carried out under Sadat's orders. Furthermore, Mubarak opened a dialogue with the 
militant Islamic organizations in an attempt to persuade them to deradicalize and embrace 
nonviolent methods of opposition, even gong so far as to release militants from prison in 
order to facilitate talks. 1 1 2 Essentially, Mubarak came to realize that Islamic 
l u y
 Voll, p. 384. 
1 1 0
 Robert Bianchi, "Islam and Democracy in Egypt," Current History 88 (1989) p. 9 3 . 
1 1 1
 Voll, pp. 384-85. 
1 , 2
 Ibid. 
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fundamentalism was not necessarily the enemy of the state or a subversive element in 
• • 113 
Egyptian society. 
On the other hand, the Brotherhood's relations with the government remained 
complicated; it was tolerated to a degree, but remained officially illegal. It was not 
allowed to distribute literature or assemble in public, and its members were subject to 
periodic arrests. Despite being outlawed, the Brotherhood had been able to take 
advantage of political and social developments in Egypt to increase its membership and 
influence. A consequence of this was that Islamic charitable organizations and private 
mosques flourished because even though many of these organizations are nonpolitical, it 
is largely within this decentralized network of associations pursuing different agendas 
and enjoying different degrees of autonomy from the state that dissent has been able to be 
expressed.1 1 4 
The Brotherhood maintained its educational grassroots strategy of slowly 
effecting change rather than resorting to violence. As a result, Brotherhood activists 
gained some influence within the state bureaucracy, and the organization gained support 
from many doctors, teachers and administrators. Also, the Brotherhood was particularly 
successful in recruiting young people, including university students and recent graduates. 
The Islamic revival that the Brotherhood offered provided a way of life in which 
young people could be respected for their piety and Islamic learning rather than for their 
social status. The belief that it is the duty of every Muslim to be involved in political and 
1 1 3
 Bianchi, p. 94. 
1 1 4
 Wickam, pp. numerous. 
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social reform can act as an antidote to political alienation and defeatism. Young people's 
work in the Brotherhood included supporting Brotherhood-backed candidates in elections 
in student unions, professional associations, government, and participating in 
demonstrations. In addition, women from lower-middle-class backgrounds have found 
that stricter adherence to Islamic religious observances provides them with increased 
respect in the community, which enables them to disregard other social codes that would 
otherwise limit their options in areas such as education, career and marriage. 1 1 3 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Brotherhood-backed candidates gained large 
majorities on the executive boards of several leading professional associations, such as 
those representing lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, scientists and engineers, where they 
defeated government, secular, and militant Islamic candidates in competitive open 
elections. Brotherhood-sponsored plans included offering health insurance, low-interest 
loans and training to the undereducated and other sweeping social programs. However, 
the limited resources available to the professional associations meant that these programs 
were not very widespread and did not to have any significant effect on the larger 
Egyptian population. 
Nevertheless, these associations did give the Brotherhood a platform from which 
to criticize Egypt's lack of free parliamentary and presidential elections and to call for the 
repeal of the emergency law that imposed drastic limits on legal political opposition.1 1 6 
1 1 5
 Wickham, pp. 36-62, 75-87, 164-171. 
1 , 6
 Wickham, pp. 178-199. 
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Parliamentary elections, though largely closed to the opposition, give some 
indication of the Brotherhood's popularity under Mubarak. In the 1984 elections, the 
Brotherhood was allowed to run candidates for the Wafd party, which won 65 out of 450 
parliamentary seats. This election established the Wafd party as the largest opposition 
group in Egypt with Brotherhood members holding 7 of the 65 sea ts . 1 1 7 Ironically, the 
new alliance between the Wafd party and the Muslim Brotherhood came about because 
of the opportunities which the leadership of the two organizations had had to mingle and 
associate with each other in prison during Sadat's crackdowns on opposition movements 
in 1981. 1 1 8 Nevertheless, the Mubarak regime would not allow legal recognition of the 
Brotherhood or even return the organization's headquarters or control over the 
publication of al Da 'wa to the Brotherhood.1 1 9 
In 1987 the Brotherhood was permitted to repeat the experiment in secular 
parliamentary politics, this time running candidates under the Socialist Labor Party and 
the Liberal Party. In this election, this new coalition, called the Islamic Alliance, won 
120 
sixty seats in Parliament with the Brotherhood holding thirty-eight of those seats. In 
both elections the party aligned with the Brotherhood received more votes than all the 
other opposition parties combined. ~ The effect of this participation in parliamentary 
elections was that the Muslim Brotherhood became an active participant in the ruling 
political system. They were the opposition but by participating in the process, they gave 
1 1 7
 Voll, p. 386. 
1 1 8
 Ramadan, p. 172. 
1 1 9
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it legitimacy. The takfir organizations, which sought an Islamic alternative to the 
Egyptian system, were thus left out in the cold, with no power or input. 
In response to the Brotherhood's alarming level of influence the government 
again resorted to repressive measures. In 1993, professional associations were placed 
under direct state control; in 1998, hundreds of student Islamic activists were arrested just 
before student union elections; in 1995 and 1996, over a thousand Brothers were arrested. 
Several were sentenced to several years of hard labor by military tribunals. The primary 
charge against them was that they were members of an illegal organization that planned 
to overthrow the government. 
The Brotherhood has made a comeback in recent years, as the old guard has 
gradually died off and its middle-generation leaders have become more influential within 
the organization. In 2000, the Brotherhood ran seventy-six parliamentary candidates and 
won seventeen seats despite the government's extensive media campaign against it and 
123 
the arrest of several of its candidates shortly before the election. 
In 2001, the Lawyers' Association held open elections for its executive board for 
the first time in five years. The Brotherhood chose to contest only a third of the seats, in 
order to avoid embarrassing the regime, but won all of them. 1 2 4 
Most recently the Brotherhood has called for greater democracy in the Middle 
East and has begun participating in prodemocracy demonstrations. 'Abd al-Mun'im 
1 2 2
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1 2 3
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Abu'l-Futuh, one of the middle-generation leaders who is respected in the Brotherhood 
said: 
The absence of democracy is one of the main reasons for the crisis here, in Egypt 
and the Middle East. The Muslim Brothers believe that the Western governments 
are one of the main reasons for the lack of democracy in the region because they 
are supporting dictatorships in the Arab and Islamic region in general, despite the 
fact that it has been proved that the absence of democracy and freedom is the 
125 
reason for terrorism and violence. 
In the November 2005 parliamentary elections the Muslim Brotherhood had a list 
of over 150 independent candidates (who had to run as independents since the 
Brotherhood is still banned as a political party). However, they were allowed to advertise 
their affiliation with the organization for the first time. The group decided not to field 
candidates in some of the constituencies where senior government officials were running, 
in order to maintain good relations with the government. In the three stages of elections 
held November 7, November 20, and December 1, the Muslim Brotherhood claimed 
eighty-seven seats in Parliament, thus more than tripling its presence in the government. 
These results are interesting for a number of reasons. The Brotherhood obtained 
these results without having a clear program or policy. It is now in the spotlight and will 
be forced to define its political program and reaffirm its commitment to democratic 
reform. 
Second, the candidates ran on Islamic slogans such as "Islam is the solution." The 
religious- based campaign was aimed at gaining the support of under-educated poor 
Egyptians who traditionally have not backed the Brotherhood. It appears to have worked. 
1 2 5
 Ibid., pp. 222. 
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It will be interesting to see if the Brotherhood can maintain this support beyond the 
elections or whether it will return to being perceived as an elitist intellectually driven 
organization. 
Third, the voter turnout was only about 25%. These numbers are a terrible 
indictment of the election's legitimacy and for the future of democratic reform in Egypt. 
In comparison, American voter turnout is 54% while many Western European countries 
boast high voter turnout, between 73% in Spain and 92% in Austria. Something must 
be done to encourage more widespread participation in the political process by the 
average Egyptian citizen. 
Finally, allegations of rigged elections and voter intimidation by the government 
must be addressed. The potential for real change to the process is extremely slim, at least 
in the near future. However, with its new high-profile image as the preeminent 
opposition group in the government the Brotherhood must focus attention on this issue 
and publicly appeal for real democratic reforms. If it does not, it risks losing the support 
of the many dissatisfied reformers and activists in Egyptian society. 
Conclusion 
The history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt can be characterized by long 
periods of an adversarial relationship with the government involving repression and 
animosity followed by brief periods of cooperation. For the most part, the Brotherhood 
1 2 6
 Mark N. Franklin 's "Electoral Part icipation" found in Controversies in Voting 
Behavior (2001) . 
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has been a peaceful intellectual organization whose long-term goals revolve around 
affecting change through winning over the masses through its social programs and 
educational programs. It advocates policies that include gradualism, moderation and 
constitutionalism. Occasionally, the radical fringe of the organization has become violent 
when the organization has been threatened by the state. Furthermore, during periods of 
government repression, the radical fringe developed a major following among 
mainstream fundamentalists, often undermining the nonviolent goals of the organization 
and inspiring more radical organizations. These violent elements were periodically 
purged from the organization following the moderation of relations between the 
Brotherhood and the state. Yet, the influence of the radical fringe continued to affect the 
militant fundamentalists for many years. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN JORDAN 
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I the mandated 
state of Transjordan was established almost as an afterthought to the mandate for 
Palestine. It was an almost entirely artificial construct without any common ethnic, 
geographic or political ties, and the territory also lacked any significant natural resources 
or possibilities for creating industrial infrastructure. Hence, the territory and later the 
state became economically dependent upon foreign aid, first from Britain and since the 
1950s from the United States. By the 1970s oil rich Arab Gulf states had also become 
large contributors of foreign aid to Jordan. Estimates of foreign aid are as high as $1.3 
billion annually during the 1980s. 1 2 7 This artificial construction also meant that Jordanian 
identity had to be constructed from scratch. This nation, identity and state building 
process was a very fragile thing. The Muslim Brotherhood came to play a significant role 
in that process. 
In this chapter we will first examine the twentieth-century history of Jordan and 
examine the role the Brotherhood played in maintaining the stability of the country and 
1 2 7 G l e n n E. Robinson, "Defensive Democra t i za t ion in Jordan" International Journal Of Middle East 
Studies Vol .30, No.3 (1998): p.390. 
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promoting the legitimacy of the Hashemite family. We will see how this earned the 
Brotherhood special consideration under the law and a prominent role in Jordanian 
society. 
Then we will examine how the dependence on foreign support left the Kingdom 
of Jordan economically vulnerable and largely beholden to external influences. Foreign 
dependence, combined with a lack of perceived legitimacy due to the artificial nature of 
the state led to a need for the Hashemite government to create ties to the population by 
creating the elements of a welfare state. The Hashemite rulers had to liberalize their 
economy while staying in tight control of the country. This led to a series of reforms that 
were not popular with segments of the population, including the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Liberalization was viewed as Westernization. The Islamic fundamentalists would 
continue to be bitterly opposed to what they perceived as pandering to the West. 
We will examine how King Hussein and later King Abdullah II manipulated the 
electoral process to achieve their goals of liberalizing Jordan by marginalizing their 
detractors through the electoral process. Enfranchisement provided the Hashemite 
regime with further tools to manipulate the Jordanian population to serve their own 
purposes. King Hussein managed to marginalize the opposition by including them in a 
political process that had little real meaning. He then used their participation in the 
government to legitimize his rule and his government's policies. His successor and son, 
Abdullah II, has continued the process and included a plan for economic reform and 
globalization while abandoning some of his father's more radical political positions. 
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The Early History of Jordan 
Jordan is not a nation-state in the sense that western European states are nation-
states. There is no single ethnic or national group geographically or politically associated 
with the piece of territory called Transjordan created in 1921 by imperial Britain from 
their mandate on the territory of Palestine. However, the borders were artificial and 
encompassed a heterogeneous population including various Bedouin tribes, Circassians, 
Turks, Kurds, Armenians, and Chechens and Palestinians. The nation needed to create a 
Jordanian identity and then convince or coerce these groups to adopt it. 
Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill installed the Hashemite family from 
northern Arabia to rule Transjordan after the young Abdullah moved into the region with 
a small band of loyal followers and threatened to provoke a conflict with French forces in 
Syria. Essentially, Abdullah made it clear that he could be a friend to Britain or a thorn 
in their side. Britain, more interested in the populated Levantine coast and the political 
hot potato of Zionism in Palestine chose to appoint Abdullah Emir of the mandate of 
Transjordan rather than have to oversee the area and its problems directly. The 
Transjordanian treasury consisted of British financial aid established on the basis of an 
annual subsidy. 
A native civil service was gradually trained with British assistance. Still 
Abdullah ruled directly with a small executive council, much in the manner of a tribal 
shaykh. British officials handled issues of defense, finance, and foreign policy, leaving 
internal political affairs to Abdullah. 
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However, the new Emir and his followers, while Arab and Muslim, were still 
strangers in a strange land who then had to build a nation from scratch. Transjordan was 
not created to meet national aspirations of a given community in a common territory. The 
artificially-drawn boundaries outlined a new 'state' which had not previously constituted a 
definite political entity. These boundaries were imposed on different, unrelated 
population groups. Local leaders including prominent tribal chiefs, heads of the 
Circassian community, notables of traditional elite families, members of the emerging 
middle class, and urban elites, gradually became amenable to adopting the label of 
Jordanians when they realized the advantages for themselves if people's sense of 
identification with their immediate locale could be converted into national patriotism. 
Furthermore, Transjordan lacked strong traditional competitors to Identity, 
namely pan-Islam and Pan-Arabism. The region was really regarded as being between 
the important places. It was on the caravan routes between the Mediterranean Sea and 
Damascus or Baghdad. Later, the rail lines running from Istanbul to the other great cities 
ran through it. However, the region was always viewed as no more than a way-point to 
destinations beyond. Therefore, the population that chose to call that region home were 
looked down upon by their cosmopolitan contemporaries. These biases led to a situation 
where the ulama of the region were not considered as important or as influential as their 
Egyptian or Syrian counterpoints. With lack of prestige comes lack of influence. So, 
while Islam was a way of life to the average Transjordanian, it did not come close to 
transcending their local and tribal ties. Essentially, this was not fertile ground for Pan-
Islamic sentiments or esoteric Islamic Fundamentalist ideology. 
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Yet, the nascent Jordanian identity was not self-evidently pro-Hashemite. Some of 
those leaders criticized Abdullah's role within the British designs, as well as his 
preference for foreigners in his governments, perceiving him as a puppet of the British. 
They also negatively viewed Abdullah's expansionist ambitions, suspecting that he 
regarded Jordan as a mere springboard for the take-over of other more appealing 
territories in Greater Syria. 
Over the course of many years, Abdullah managed to turn the disadvantage of 
being a foreigner to Transjordan into an asset. As an outsider he owed no commitment to 
any specific region or to any specific community or tribe. On the face of it at least, had 
no reason to prefer a certain group or a certain sector of society. This allowed him to 
manipulate the population and to craft a Jordanian identity from scratch. 
Abdullah emphasized three aspects of Jordanian-ness in his nation-building plan. 
First, Abdullah emphasized the Hashemite claim to being direct descendents of the 
prophet Muhammad. This, combined with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood from 
the late 1940s on, cemented the Hashemite religious legitimacy to rule. 
Second, Abdullah promoted the image of the noble and romantic figure of the 
archetypical Bedouin as the cornerstone of Jordanian identity. This mythical image of a 
purer, pastoral Arab people dovetailed with the Hashemite ties to the Prophet, essentially 
establishing the Jordanian identity as the "true" Arab identity, free of adulteration and 
corruption with the rightful and legitimate descendent of Muhammad as their leader. 
The third aspect of Jordanian identity that Abdullah used was to promote the 
1916-1918 Arab Revolt. This event was popular throughout the Arab world because it 
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was viewed as an Arab led effort to overthrow the Turks who were widely perceived as 
having dominated the Arabs under their rule in the Ottoman Empire and who presided 
over the relative decline of the Muslim world when compared to the West. The 
popularity of the Arab Revolt also served to bolster the reputation of the Emir since the 
Hashemite families were the key leaders of the revolt. Finally, the Arab Revolt was a 
reminder of the close ties the Arabs of the greater Syrian area had to their British allies 
that had facilitated the revolt in the first place. 
By emphasizing these three aspects of Jordanian identity and alternately giving 
each one more weight and importance as the situation demanded, Emir Abdullah began to 
craft a national identity out of the raw materials provided to him. At times he would use 
myth and legend to remind people of their noble Bedouin ancestry. Although Bedouins 
were not initially accorded the same rights as sedentary citizens, their culture was 
appropriated by the Jordanian government; it was reimagined and redefined, then labeled 
the authentic Jordanian traditional cultural identity. 
At other times he would target their unity through religion. Securing the support 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1950s greatly contributed to these efforts. Still at 
others he would place greater weight upon the traditional tribal loyalties of the Jordanian 
people. Abdullah's greatest skill was knowing exactly which narrative was appropriate 
for each audience. Thus, by ensuring the backing and loyalty of the tribal system, 
Abdullah crafted his state institutions around tribal and Bedouin identity. 
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Independence and Statehood: The Palestinian Question 
When the British Mandate came to an end in 1946 and Transjordan turned into an 
independent Kingdom, the Jordanian identity was adopted by most of her population. 
This identity was based on the common territory (which was separated from the 
neighboring countries by modern borders), the central administration, formed around the 
tribal system and the army and comprised of intensely loyal Bedouins. Finally, it 
consisted of a loyalty to King Abdullah and to the Hashemite Dynasty. Elements of 
Arabic and Islamic identities were interwoven throughout. 
During the 1948 war Abdullah achieved some of his territorial ambitions. The 
Arab Legion took over parts of the West Bank, which were annexed and later formally 
incorporated into his Kingdom, which was subsequently renamed The Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan in 1950. While this added to the Kingdom less than 7% of territory it 
tripled the population. About half of the newcomers were refugees. The official policy 
encouraged the complete integration of the Palestinians in the Kingdom and gave them 
the option of full civil and political rights. At the same time the regime insisted on 
maintaining the hegemony of the Jordanians over the Palestinians. King Abdullah 
therefore adopted a policy (that King Hussein continued to follow after succeeding his 
grandfather to the throne in 1953) of'controlled integration' that deliberately 
discriminated against the collective Palestinian body in the West Bank but not against the 
Palestinians as individuals in order to prevent them from taking advantage of their 
majority and challenge the political supremacy of the Hashemite establishment and his 
supporters in the East bank. A further problem was that the Palestinians tended to be 
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more cosmopolitan and generally had a higher level of education than their Jordanian 
counterparts. In a very real sense Jordan risked being overwhelmed by the Palestinian 
identity. 
The Palestinian people continued to dream of liberating their homeland and called 
on the Arab states to assist them in achieving this goal. The issue of independent 
statehood or another expansion of the Jordanian borders would be decided based on 
principles of self-determination after liberation had occurred. 
Essentially, Jordan wished to absorb Palestinian identity into a greater Jordanian 
identity and assimilate them into a new Jordanian identity that would continue to 
reinforce the Hashemite kingship and would legitimize any future territorial claims to 
Palestine occupied by Israel. The Palestinians did not have any desire to create a new 
identity. They wished for military aid in defeating Israel. The Muslim Brotherhood in 
Jordan was caught in between. They fully supported the liberation of Palestine but 
history would show that they would not cross the king. Their national identity as 
Jordanians would transcend any pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic sentiments and when forced to 
choose sides, they would consistently side with the Hashemite throne. 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan 
The Muslim Brotherhood formed a branch in Transjordan in 1942 by religious 
minded Transjordanian tribal leaders who were impressed with the organization in Egypt. 
Their platform did not widely differ from that of the Egyptian organization and early on 
they were largely directed by the parent organization in Egypt until world events 
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overtook them. When Israel declared statehood in 1948, Jordan found itself on the front 
lines of the first Arab-Israeli war. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood found their 
defining identity when they became ideologically committed to liberating the Palestinian 
people from Jewish Zionist occupation. Arab fighters affiliated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood poured in from all over the Arab world, mostly from Egypt. The combined 
Arab forces were not successful but the Jordanian army and the Muslim Brotherhood 
fighters both performed better than expected in the conflict and Jordan annexed the West 
Bank. 
Both economic constraints and government policy encouraged migration from the 
overpopulated West Bank to the under-populated East Bank. The educated Palestinians 
soon became the backbone of the urban middle class in Amman and other east Bank 
cities. The Palestinian people and the surrounding Arab states were still reeling from 
their loss to the new Zionist state of Israel. This situation made Muslim identity far more 
prevalent in Jordan than it had ever been before. Furthermore, the Egyptian banning of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in 1948 and the subsequent crack down on the organization 
caused many members to flee to Jordan where they received a warm welcome. 
The regime in Jordan was eager to enhance its relationship with the Brotherhood 
since their goals of liberating Palestine from Israel dovetailed with the throne's desire to 
further expand the territory of Jordan across all of Palestine. In addition to territorial 
ambitions this favorable relationship continued because of the Jordanian King's need to 
secure popular and ideological support in his struggle against leftist and nationalist trends 
opposing the Jordanian monarchy. 
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At times of crisis, the Brotherhood proved to take the King's side against his 
enemies. This culminated in Nasser's attempt to overthrow the Hasemite throne. King 
Abdullah I was assassinated in 1951 and eventually succeeded by his grandson Hussein 
in 1952. Nasser became the driving force of the Pan-Arab movement known as 
Nasserism. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was an obstacle to his goals. This 
obvious threat to the Hashemite throne culminated in an attempted coup by Army chief of 
staff Abu Nuwwar backed by Nasserists and Ba'ath nationalists, probably in 
collaboration with the Jordanian Prime Minister Sulayman al-Nabulsi. The details of the 
coup attempt are not clear but during the crisis the Brotherhood held massive conferences 
and meetings to mobilize support for King Hussein, portraying him as the defender of 
Islam against Communism and atheism, and attacked his opponents as being 
pro-communist and un-Islamic. The relationship between the king and the Brotherhood 
became closer than ever after the crisis. He used to visit the Brotherhood headquarters 
frequently and when political parties were banned, the Muslim Brotherhood was granted 
special privilege to continue functioning as a social and charitable organization. 
1964-1967 
A few years after the coup attempt another crisis developed in Jordan. Hussein's 
attempts at integrating the Palestinian identity and the Jordanian identity into a single 
unified hybrid identity under Hashemite rule would be challenged with the establishment 
of the PLO in 1964. As the organization was founded following the unanimous resolution 
of an Arab summit, King Hussein could oppose neither it nor its activities in the West 
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Bank. That was the beginning of almost a generation long struggle over the issue of the 
Palestinian representation. The blunt activities of the PLO's chairman, Ahmad Shuqairi, 
among the West Bank Palestinians not only challenged Jordan's authority there but also 
threatened to shake the precarious Jordanian-Palestinian identity. Furthermore, the PLO's 
goals mirrored the core goals of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood but the PLO treated 
them as outsiders with suspect loyalties. 
Almost immediately, trouble developed between the PLO and Hussein's 
government. Conflict arose because the PLO attempted to assume quasi governmental 
functions, such as taxing Palestinians and distributing arms to villagers in the West Bank 
and among the refugees, acts that infringed on Jordanian sovereignty. 
Al Fatah and the PLO carried out raids and sabotage against Israel without 
clearance from either the United Arab Command or Jordan. These attacks, although 
planned in Syria, most often were launched into Israel by infiltration through Lebanon or 
Jordan. Israeli reprisals against selected West Bank targets became harsher and more 
frequent from May 1965 onward. Meanwhile, Syrian propaganda against Hussein became 
increasingly strident. In July 1966, when Hussein severed official endorsement and 
support for the PLO, both that organization and the Syrian government turned against 
him. The Muslim Brotherhood continued to support the Hashemite throne. 
In reprisal for the terrorist attacks by the fedayeen (Palestinian guerrillas), in 
November Israel assaulted the West Bank village of As Samu. Public rioting against the 
Jordanian government's inability to protect its people broke out among the inhabitants of 
the West Bank. The levels of rioting exceeded any previous civil unrest. Hussein used the 
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army to restore public order. Political pressure against Hussein mounted, however, along 
with armed clashes on the Syria-Jordan border. King Hussein was forced to confront the 
PLO's challenge to his authority. 
Regional tensions continued to escalate as well, culminating in the Arab-Israeli 
war of 1967. The Arab forces were soundly defeated by Israel. After only two days of 
combat, Jordan's army had been beaten. Hussein was determined to hold as much ground 
as possible in the event that a cease-fire was arranged and the fighting continued. By the 
time he agreed to a truce on June 7, Israeli forces had seized the West Bank and the Old 
City of Jerusalem. During the war about 224,000 new Palestinian refugees fled from the 
West Bank into Jordan. Furthermore, nearly half of the country's best agricultural land 
and its main tourist attractions and holy sights were now occupied by Israel. 
The PLO and Black September 
Following the 1967 War, Hussein's government faced the critical problems of 
repairing a shattered economy, providing for the welfare of the refugees, obtaining 
foreign aid, and rebuilding the armed forces. Internally, however, the major problem was 
the continuing confrontation with the several Palestinian guerrilla organizations, chief 
among them, the PLO. 
The PLO had had no role in the June 1967 War. In light of the failure of the Arab 
states to defeat Israel, the Palestinians decided to adopt guerrilla warfare tactics as the 
most effective method of attacking and defeating Israel. In February 1969, Arafat, who 
remained the leader of Fatah, became head of the PLO. 
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Hussein viewed the militant organizations as foreign agitators. He still sought to 
be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and he still sought to 
integrate them into a hybrid society. So, Hussein sought accommodation with the 
fedayeen and provided training sites and assistance as a way to address the wishes of the 
Palestinian people whom he was still courting. 
In Jordan's internal politics, however, the main issue between 1967 and 1971 was 
the struggle between the government and the guerrilla organizations for political control 
of the country. In the refugee camps, the Palestinian guerillas developed a system that 
was nearly a state within a state. They easily acquired funding and weapons from both 
the Arab states and Eastern Europe and openly defied Jordanian law. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, while remaining loyal, were little help. While the Brotherhood was a 
religious organization the PLO was a political and Palestinian nationalist organization 
whose members were not susceptible to religious based arguments unless they furthered 
the goal of achieving Palestinian liberation. 
As the guerrilla attacks against Israel increased, Israel retaliated quickly and with 
extreme effectiveness. In March 1968, an Israeli brigade attacked the Jordanian village of 
Al Karamah, said to be the guerrilla capital. Although the brigade inflicted damage, it 
was driven back and in the process suffered substantial losses. The incident boosted 
Palestinian morale and gave the PLO instant popularity within the Arab community. In 
reprisal, Israel launched heavy attacks on Irbid in June 1968 and on Salt in August. By 
late 1968, the main fedayeen activities in Jordan seemed to shift from fighting Israel to 
attempts to overthrow Hussein in Jordan. 
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A major confrontation between the Palestinian militants and the Jordanian 
government occurred in November 1968 when the government sought to disarm the 
refugee camps. Civil war was narrowly averted by a compromise that favored the 
Palestinians. The threat to Hussein's authority and the heavy Israeli reprisals that 
followed each guerrilla attack were unacceptable to King Hussein. There were occasional 
outbursts of fighting between the Palestinian militants and the army during the first half 
of 1970. In June 1970, an Arab mediation committee intervened to halt two weeks of 
serious fighting between them. On June 9, 1970, the Jordanian government and Arafat 
signed an agreement that favored the Palestinians. According to its provisions, the 
government allowed the militants freedom of movement within Jordan, agreed to refrain 
from antiguerrilla action, and expressed its support for the militants in the battle against 
Israel. In return, the guerillas pledged to remove their bases from Amman and other 
major cities, to withdraw armed personnel from the Jordanian capital, and to show 
respect for law and order. 
However, by early September, the guerrilla groups controlled several strategic 
positions in Jordan, including the oil refinery near Az Zarqa. The fedayeen were also 
calling for a general strike of the Jordanian population and were organizing a civil 
disobedience campaign. Then the PFLP launched an airplane hijacking campaign. King 
Hussein viewed the hijackings as a direct threat to his authority in Jordan. In response, on 
September 16 he reaffirmed martial law and immediately ordered the fedayeen to lay 
down their arms and to evacuate the cities. On the same day, Arafat became supreme 
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commander of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), the regular military force of the 
PLO. 
During a bitterly fought ten-day civil war, primarily between the PLA and the 
Jordan Arab Army, Syria sent about two hundred tanks to aid the fedayeen. On 
September 17, however, Iraq began a rapid withdrawal of its twelve thousand man force 
stationed near Az Zarqa. The United States Navy dispatched the Sixth Fleet to the eastern 
Mediterranean, and Israel undertook "precautionary military deployments" to aid 
Hussein, if necessary, against the guerrilla forces. Under attack from the Jordanian army 
and in response to outside pressures, the Syrian forces began to withdraw from Jordan on 
September 24, having lost more than half their armor in fighting with the Jordanians. The 
fedayeen found themselves on the defensive throughout Jordan and agreed on September 
25 to a cease-fire. At the urging of the Arab heads of state, Hussein and Arafat signed the 
cease-fire agreement in Cairo on September 27. 
The last few months of 1970 and the first six months of 1971 were marked by a 
series of broken agreements and by continued battles between the guerrilla forces and the 
Jordanian army, which continued its drive to oust the Palestinian militants from the 
populated areas. Persistent pressure by the army compelled the fedayeen to withdraw 
from Amman in April 1971. Feeling its existence threatened, Fatah abandoned its earlier 
posture of noninvolvement in the internal affairs of an Arab state and issued a statement 
demanding the overthrow of the Jordanian "puppet separatist authority." In a subsequent 
early May statement, it called for "national rule" in Jordan. 
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Again, the Muslim Brotherhood held massive conferences and meetings to 
mobilize support for King Hussein, portraying him as the father of Jordan and 
representing the militant Palestinians as foreign aggressors. Essentially, despite their 
platform based on liberating Palestine from Israeli occupation, the organization chose to 
side with the Hashemite throne over the PLO. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood 
effectively declared themselves a purely Jordanian movement first. 
On July 19, the government announced that the remainder of the bases in northern 
Jordan had been destroyed. Hussein became virtually isolated from the rest of the Arab 
world, which accused him of harsh treatment of the fedayeen and denounced him as 
being responsible for the deaths of so many of his fellow Arabs. 
The events of this Civil War acted as a catalyst for Jordanian national identity. 
The Palestinian identity had proven too volatile to assimilate fully into Jordanian society. 
The agitation of the Palestinian militant organizations led to a clear division among the 
Arabs residing in Jordan. The Palestinian refugees provided an "other" to which East 
Bank Arabs could compare themselves. In short, the failed attempt to create a hybrid 
identity resulted in the strengthening of the separate identity. East Bank Arabs embraced 
Jordanian nationalism and condemned the Palestinians for bringing so much strife into 
the country. Furthermore, the isolation by the other Arab countries caused the 
Jordanians, who felt this was unjust, to band together even more. The Jordanian Muslim 
Brotherhood had thoroughly demonstrated their loyalty to the throne and their 
commitment to Jordan first. 
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Liberalization 
Over the last two decades Jordan has been gradually liberalizing. They have held 
four parliamentary elections (1989, 1993, 1997 and 2003) and King Abdullah II himself 
has professed plans to continue with these political reforms and the democratization 
process. 1 2 8 This pro-Western political and economic plan is a direct result of the internal 
strife instigated by Jordanian economic and social problems. Liberalization led to a 
redefinition of Jordanian identity that allowed for peace with Israel. 
The influx of money from the Arab oil states in the 1970s combined with the aid 
received from the West led to a boom in Jordan and raised popular expectations of 
continued economic prosperity. The standard of living rose steadily and the patrimonial 
relationship of the welfare state prospered. Per capita GNP was around $2000 annually 
by 1985 and Jordanians working abroad in the oil fields of the oil rich Arab countries sent 
more than a billion dollars back home annually.1 2 9 Since foreign aid was the source of 
the revenue that was necessary to maintain this patrimonial welfare relationship with the 
population, and the very Jordanian identity was so fragile, the stability of the state itself 
became dependent upon its "rentier" relationship with foreign powers. 1 3 0 
However, several serious problems had arisen by the 1980s. First, the United 
States cut off aid as a result of King Hussein's refusal to sign a peace treaty with Israel 
and Egypt. Second, aid from the Arab oil states gradually dried up as that money was 
diverted to supporting Iraq in the Iran/Iraq war and finally, the oil boom of the 1970s 
1 2 8
 h t tp : / /www.kingabdul lah . jo 
1 2 9
 Robinson, p .390. 
1 3 0
 John M. Roberts , "Defensive Democrat izat ion in Jordan" Arab Studies Quarterly Vol . 13, N o . 3&4 
(1991) : pp. 387-410. 
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came to an abrupt end. 1 1 By 1990 foreign aid was down to $393 million, and 
remittances sent home by Jordanians working abroad dropped to $623 million annually 
by 1989. 1 3 2 The reality of the situation was that the Hashemite government did not have 
the necessary funds to maintain the welfare state and the bureaucratic system on which its 
legitimacy and stability was based. 
This monetary crisis led to Jordan secretly turning to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to alleviate the crisis. The IMF demanded that Jordan embark upon a 
program of reform that included cutting both subsides and state expenditures, both staples 
of the Jordanian welfare system.1 3 3 In response, the government of Jordan was obliged to 
halt many large-scale construction projects, slash food and other subsidies, and 
significantly reduce public employment. Further demands by the IMF forced price 
increases on cigarettes, gasoline and alcohol and a ban on the import of all luxury items 
including electric appliances and automobiles.1 3 4 King Hussein also attempted to 
revitalize the economy through sweeping liberalizing reforms but was unsuccessful due 
largely to corruption, incompetence and an entrenched political elite which was 
dependent upon the existing system. 
Hussein's initial response to the rise in public discontent was to ease restrictions 
on the political process. In 1981 he increased membership of the National Consultative 
Linda Schull Adams "Polit ical Liberalization in Jordan" Journal of Church and State Vol. 38 , Issue 3 
(1996) : pp. 507-528 . 
1 3 2
 Robinson, p .390. 
1 3 3
 Robinson, p. 389. 
1 3 4
 Adams , p. 508 . 
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Council (NCC) from sixty to seventy-five. 1 3 5 But since the NCC was only empowered to 
debate and discuss bills and had no authority to make laws, this increase in its 
membership did not appease the opposition's quest for democratic reforms. 
The 1989 Election 
The downward economic spiral, the increasingly austere demands of the IMF and 
the Hashemite government's inability to enact any successful reforms, culminated in 
mass rioting in April 1989. Perhaps what was most disturbing to King Hussein was that 
the rioting was centered in the traditional south and on the East Bank, both strongholds of 
support for his regime. 1 3 6 With the stability of the state in question King Hussein decided 
to embark upon a plan of political reform and controlled democratic liberalization, 
despite the fact that this was not widely called for or even part of the demands of the 
rioters, who were more concerned about inflation and the down-sizing of the welfare 
system. King Hussein perceived democratic liberalization as a preemptive strike, aimed 
at gaining public acceptance of the necessary cutbacks in the patrimonial system by 
offering greater political participation and creating a form of public discourse. 
According to the Jordanian constitution, the legislative power resides with the 
King and the parliament. The latter is comprised of an upper house (Senate) of forty 
members appointed by the King and a Lower House (Chamber of Deputies) of eighty 
members elected by universal suffrage, with men and women over the age of eighteen 
l j 5
 The N C C was created in April 1978 to fulfill the legislative functions of the dissolved House of 
Representat ives . 
1 , 6
 A d a m s , p. 3 . 
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eligible to vote. The King is head of state and has the power to ratify the laws and 
promulgate them, direct the government to enact and enforce bylaws and regulations, 
exercise judicial authority by Royal Decree, and inaugurate, adjourn, suspend and 
dissolve the lower house when he deems necessary. The King also appoints the Prime 
Minister and may dismiss him. In addition, he appoints the ministers and may dismiss 
them as well. 
With these broadly based powers King Hussein was able to manipulate the 
election process, effectively ensuring a favorable outcome that supported his regime and 
his goals. First, Jordan had been in a state of emergency under martial law since the 1967 
war; as a result of this and other measures there was virtually no free press. Most media 
was owned, subsidized or censored by the government, and criticism of the government 
was often harshly punished.1 3 7 Political parties were also illegal so opposition groups 
like the Muslim Brotherhood had to form unofficial cooperatives. 
Second, the electoral system was set up in such a way so as to ensure widespread 
inclusion of diverse segments of the population while discouraging coalitions from 
forming. The number of parliamentary seats was increased from sixty to eighty. On the 
other hand, a new system of allocations was introduced. In certain constituencies, a given 
number of seats were allocated to long standing minority communities like Christians, 
Circassians, Chechens and Bedouins, amounting to around thirty per cent of the total 
number of parliamentary seats, far in excess of their numerical representation in the 
population. Also, each constituency was represented in parliament by more than one 
l j
 Article 19, Jordan: Democratization without Press Freedom, 22 March 1994, p . 5. 
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seat; some were even allocated up to seven seats. Basically, representation was not on the 
basis of one vote per a person because voters in one constituency could be voting for as 
many as seven open seats, and would thus get to vote for multiple candidates depending 
on the number of seats allocated to the constituency. This system allowed for block 
voting. 
Third, King Hussein managed to convince many diverse groups, often with 
opposing ideological goals, to participate in the election process. Palestinians, Islamists, 
tribal factions and urbanized Jordanians all participated in the elections, under the 
government's rules, thereby giving a de facto endorsement to the election and legitimacy 
to King Hussein's liberalization program. The big winners of the 1989 election, other 
than the King and his regime, were the Islamists. They picked up twenty of the contested 
138 • 
seats and were closely allied with fourteen others. However, rather than alarming the 
government or detracting from the King's authority, this result ultimately worked to his 
advantage. Since the parliament had no power, and the King could disband it at any time, 
they were no real threat. Instead, the Islamists became part of the system. They were no 
longer the opposition on the outside that could criticize the King for not basing Jordanian 
law on the Shar'ia. Now they were part of the government and eventually came to be 
perceived as being part of the inefficiencies and stagnation of the bureaucracy. Their 
credibility slipped, while the King managed to marginalize a major opponent and 
legitimize his liberalization program. These elections also saw the powerful monarch 
J
 John M. Roberts "Prospects for Democracy in Jo rdan" Arab Studies Quarterly vol . 13, no. 3 (1991) : p. 
122. 
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acknowledge mistakes and the need for change. Islamic fundamentalists moved to the 
forefront of a newly relevant political arena, a revitalized parliamentary life, and the 
• 139 
regime's vow to "modernize" Jordan by broadening political participation. 
The 1993 Election 
With the easing of tensions, the emergency regulations were frozen in 1989, and 
formally lifted in April 1992. This new freedom opened the way for the legalization of 
political parties and the introduction of new press laws. On July 5, 1992, Parliament 
formally legalized political parties. In August 1993, Parliament passed an amendment to 
the election law that adjusted Jordan's electoral system to the principle of "one person, 
one vote." In the 1989 elections, where voters had as many votes as there were seats to 
be filled within the constituency, not all voters had made use of all their votes. There was 
a widespread belief that voters in the 1989 elections cast one or two votes for candidates 
with whom they had family or kinship ties, and then cast ballots for members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. These results led King Hussein to believe that the electoral system 
gave advantages to Islamist more than to loyalist candidates. Believing that most 
Jordanian voters felt loyalty to family and kin first and to political ideology second, 
Hussein decided to maintain the multimember districts but to change the law to where 
voters could only choose one candidate in their district.1 4 0 
l j 9
 Sa 'd i Walid. "Elect ion results - a first look," Jordan Times, 11 N o v e m b e r 1989. 
1 4 0
 Abla A m a w i , "The 1993 Elections in Jo rdan" Arab Studies Quarterly Vol 16 N o . 3 (1994) : pp . 16-36. 
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Hence the 1993 elections produced a much more balanced and representative 
mix of party representatives and independents than had been previously the case. The 
Islamic Action Front (an Islamist party including the Muslim Brotherhood) won 20% of 
the seats with around 17% of the votes, Independent pro-monarchists won 60% of the 
seats with 58% of the votes, and smaller groupings of independent Islamists, Leftist, 
Nationalist, and Fatah Movement candidates had minor representation. 1 4 1 
The 1993 election demonstrates that King Hussein's regime had recognized the 
potential obstacle posed by the Islamists to his future liberalizing plans. Hence he 
restructured the electoral process, under the guise of making it more fair, in order to 
undermine the growing power of the Muslim Brotherhood. In response, the Muslim 
Brotherhood entered into cooperation with several other fundamentalist organizations and 
founded the Islamic Action Front (IAF) to act as a political party in 1992. 
Basically, King Hussein managed to eliminate a potential threat to the stability of 
his regime and the future of his liberalization program through a process of apparent 
democratic reform. The legitimacy of these changes was not questioned and the big 
losers, the IAF, legitimized the election simply by participating in the process. 
The 1997 Election 
The strong showing of loyalist candidates demonstrated support for King Hussein 
and his participation in the Middle East peace process. Islamists opposed any 
normalization of relations with Israel. However, a peace treaty with Israel was signed in 
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October 1994, angering the Islamists.1 4 2 Some among the IAF questioned the legitimacy 
of participating in the democratic process, although others felt that nonparticipation 
would be even more detrimental to the Islamist cause. The Muslim Brotherhood held a 
conference on January 22, 1996 to debate the issue of participation. It was the 
culmination of a lengthy debate that resulted in the Brotherhood and the IAF deciding to 
boycott the upcoming elections.1 4 3 
In a lecture titled "Islam and Democracy, Jordan and the Muslim Brotherhood", 
presented at Kyoto University, Dr. Azam Tamimi argues that the leadership of the 
Muslim Brotherhood had pursued a series of sophisticated measures in order to influence 
the voting in favor of a boycott. Due to internal rivalries and an identity crisis among the 
various fundamentalist movements the Muslim Brotherhood wished to marginalize the 
other organizations in the IAF and reaffirm the Brotherhood as the leaders of the Islamist 
movement in Jordan. In order to achieve this, the Muslim Brotherhood had to ensure 
that IAF members were removed from positions of power in the government and that was 
exactly what boycotting the political process achieved. Instead of becoming the political 
platform of the Muslim Brotherhood, the IAF became a competitor, or even an 
alternative.1 4 4 By disempowering their own political party, and removing themselves 
from the political process, the Muslim Brotherhood essentially had no official say in 
Jordanian politics for the next several years. 
1 4 2
 Robinson, p , 4 0 3 . 
1 4 j
 Amawi , pp. 16-36. 
1 4 4
 Ibid. 
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This fracture of the Islamist movement leading up to the 1997 election is 
important for two reasons. First, it demonstrated a continuing commitment to the 
democratic process on the part of a significant number of Islamists despite their losses in 
the 1993 election and the normalization of relations with Israel. This commitment was 
crucial in solidifying the legitimacy of King Hussein's democratic reforms. 
Second, the emerging divisions among the Islamists removed one of the few 
tangible threats to the Hashemite power base. A disunited Islamist movement could not 
muster enough support to challenge any aspect of King Hussein's liberalization program. 
It was also unable to challenge the credibility of the democratic process, since it had 
already participated in it in the two previous elections. Through democratic reform and 
political maneuvering King Hussein had managed to get his opposition to turn on itself 
and effectively remove itself from the political arena. 
The Muslim Brotherhood eventually decided to amend its position on the boycott 
of the electoral process and opted to take part in the local elections in July 1999. 
Boycotting the political process, no matter how limited and how restrictive, could no 
longer be an option. 1 4 ! )Led by the IAF, fundamentalists made a respectable showing in 
these elections, winning in a few areas. These results led the IAF to validate the elections 
immediately and to declare its intention to participate in the next general elections, 
scheduled for 2 0 0 1 . 1 4 6 This was not without irony, since the opposition parties were 
supporting the democratic process put in place through the liberalization program of the 
1 4 5
 Tamimi , A z a m Islam and Democracy , Jordan and the Musl im Brotherhood ( 2 0 0 6 ) . 
1 4 6
 Ryan R. Curt is "Poli t ical Liberalization and Monarchical Succession In Jordan" Israel Affairs Vol 9 N o 
3 (2003) : p . 134. 
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Hashemite regime while the traditional elites that always supported the regime were 
opposed to that program. 
Liberalization Under King Abdullah 
In 1999 King Hussein appointed his eldest son 'Abdullah ibn Hussein as crown 
prince and heir, replacing Prince Hasan, the King's brother, who had been crown prince 
since 1965. King Hussein, who had been treated for cancer for many years, died shortly 
afterwards, and Abdullah bin Hussein was crowned King Abdullah II. Many viewed the 
1999 municipal elections as a test of the liberalization program of King Hussein that 
began in 1989, saw great advances in 1993 and survived the boycott of 1997. 1 4 7 
The elites were divided between old guard traditionalists, mostly senior bureaucrats, 
tribal leaders and large land owners who preferred the established rentier or welfare 
system that had served them well in the past, and the 'new guard' of reformists who 
supported rapid moves toward liberalization and economic modernization in the form of 
148 
free market reforms. Jordan's old guard is rooted in the powerful intelligence agency 
that vets prime ministers and their cabinets. It views democracy as a danger, at least until 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is settled, when Jordanian Palestinians will be forced to 
choose between allegiance to Jordan or to a new Palestinian state. Reformers say Jordan 
cannot postpone political or economic change if it is to tackle poverty and meet the 
aspirations of a fast-expanding population, half of whom are under age 15. "People have 
1 4 7
 Ryan, "Polit ical Liberalization and Monarchical Success ion In Jo rdan" pp. 133. 
148 
Lamis Andoni " K i n g Abdal lah: In His Father's Foots teps? " Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 29 , N o . 3 
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expectations of opportunity and freedom," the Minister of Planning, Basim Awadallah 
has said. "Reform is not a luxury. It is dictated by demographic reality." 1 4 9 
King Abdullah wished to embark upon a plan to distance Jordan politically from the 
West Bank while still maintaining influence over East Jerusalem. This would satisfy the 
traditionalist but anger the reformists. He also wished to speed up the pace of market 
reform in order to prepare Jordan for globalization.1 5 0 This would satisfy the reformists 
but alarm the traditionalists. In order for these two ideologically opposed plans to 
succeed the King needed either to gain the support of both factions of the elites, or to 
marginalize them, much in the same way as the Islamists had been marginalized in the 
1997 election. 
With traditionalists firmly entrenched in government the King's regime was secure, 
but any real progress towards liberalization and modernization was curtailed. 
Surprisingly, King Hussein had changed the line of succession from his brother whom he 
perceived as a meddler and more aligned with the traditionalists in favor of his son 
Abdullah who was loyal to the liberalization program. When King Hussein died and 
Abdullah assumed the throne, political opposition groups immediately petitioned him to 
roll back the restrictions, reform the election laws and resume the liberalization process. 
He made a point of meeting with the opposition leaders and the elites as well as other 
entities in a "national dialogue." In truth, few reforms were made. 1 5 1 King Abdullah 
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human rights. He accelerated the pace of reform in order to integrate Jordan into the 
global market and community. Jordan was admitted into the World Trade Organization 
in 2000 and a US-Jordanian Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was ratified in 2001. 
King Abdullah has been especially active on issues of economic reform. For example, 
the government has enacted a series of laws to strengthen the private sector, gradually 
introducing new business opportunities to areas normally monopolized by the state as 
well as privatizing telecommunications, transport, and other government industries. As a 
result of such measures, Jordan's external debt has decreased to 75% of GDP, while its 
foreign currency reserves have grown to $3.6 billion. 
Rollback of Democratic Liberalization 
However, the political climate of liberalization within Jordan slowed following the 
1997 election, and in some cases it was rolled back. Unfortunately for the King, a result 
of the 1996 IMF-dictated increase in the price of wheat was that the price of bread nearly 
doubled overnight and riots, similar to those in 1989, ensued. Therefore the 1997 
elections resulted in a Parliament dominated by traditionalists critical of the liberalization 
program but supportive of the regime. Although, traditionalists were unable to stop the 
liberalization process, they were able to contain it. Taking advantage of King Hussein's 
failing health and growing popular opposition to the liberalization process, the 
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traditionalists managed to infiltrate much of the liberalization program as well as the state 
security apparatus.1 5 2 
Just before his death, King Hussein enacted a series of harsh and repressive 
restrictions on the media and any criticism of the state, effectively rolling back many 
aspects of democratic reform. Following his father's example, Abdullah has repeatedly 
sacrificed democratic liberalization in favor of economic reform and globalization. For 
example, Jordan cracked down on Hamas and its leadership, many members of Hamas 
were deported, including those holding Jordanian passports. This obviously upset the 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin and was perceived as a direct attack upon their 
interests. Perhaps the ultimate example of sacrificing democratic liberalization in favor 
of economic reforms was demonstrated in 2001 when King Abdullah disbanded 
parliament and postponed future elections citing "regional circumstances" as the reason. 
He feared that rising popular unrest over economic reforms and anger at the brutal tactics 
employed by the Israelis towards the Palestinians would undermine his economic 
program. Negative public opinion over the United States' invasion first of Afghanistan 
and then of Iraq led to further postponements of the elections.1 5 4 Abdullah's plans to 
liberalize the economy, normalize relations with Israel, secure Western aid and loans to 
shore up the bankrupt economy, and support the US war against Iraq were bitterly 
opposed. As workers took to the streets in support of the Palestinians, Abdullah outlawed 
1 5 2
 Curt is Ryan & Jillian Schwedler . "Return To Democrat izat ion Or N e w Hybrid 
Reg ime?" Middle East Policy Vol . 11, N o . 2 (2004.) : pp. 142-143. 
1 5 3
 Andoni , pp. 77-78 . 
1 5 4
 Ryan, "Political Liberalization and Monarchical Succession In Jo rdan" pp. 134-140 
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public demonstrations and banned public meetings to prevent opposition organizations, 
such as the IAF from gaining power. This was essentially a return to the political 
atmosphere of 1989. 
Abdullah took these shocking steps for two reasons. First, while the 
traditionalists dominated the parliament and secured the stability of the Hashemite 
regime, they often worked to undermine or contain the globalization program that the 
King regarded as vital to the future of Jordan. Second, divisions within the Jordanian 
elites between tribal-led traditionalists and urban reformers also undermined their power 
by dividing their support base. Therefore, if elections were to be held on schedule, it was 
highly likely that the opposition forces would be very successful. This success of the 
opposition would put the stability of the regime in jeopardy and undermine Abdullah's 
pro-Western economic and globalization programs. Basically, King Abdullah decided 
that the economic liberalization program was more important than illusions of democratic 
liberalization. Since the economic program was in jeopardy he decided to use his power 
to remove all obstacles to achieving his goals, specifically Islamists, Palestinians and 
traditionalists. Since both his supporters and his opponents were divided and fighting 
amongst themselves the dissolution of parliament did not cause many problems. 
The electoral delays were symptomatic of the broader crisis between the government 
and the opposition, and indeed between the regime and Jordanian society, over the entire 
program of political liberalization and economic reform. When King Abdullah first came 
to the throne, Jordan's domestic and regional climate actually appeared to be stable and 
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the King did not hesitate to allow municipal elections to take place in 1999 as scheduled. 
The results of the election and the political landscape led the King to roll back democratic 
reforms and suspend the parliament, creating an authoritarian state. His purpose was not 
to stop the liberalization process but shifted the emphasis towards a program of economic 
reform and globalization was unpopular among both supporters and opponents of the 
regime. Basically, he had to suspend the democratic process in order to ensure that 
Jordan would continue forward with the liberalization process and improve its standing in 
the international arena. 
Liberalization During the Democratic Crisis 
Despite the extreme measures taken by the regime to eliminate virtually all 
dissent within Jordan, several advances were made in the general direction of political 
and social liberalization. In October 2002, Abdullah II launched a campaign to mobilize 
the country under the slogan "Jordan First." Thus economic development, modernization 
and incremental political reform would take precedence over the "external" concerns, 
such as Palestine, that had characterized King Hussein's rule. This slogan represented 
the regime's nationalist approach and its intention not to tolerate any exploitation of the 
divisions within Jordanian society, both between the elites and the Islamists, and between 
Palestinians and East Bank Jordanians. It also represented a rejection of any commitment 
to broader Arab or Islamic concerns.1^ The Jordan First movement was a statement that 
1 5 5
 Curt is Ryan, " Liberalization and Deliberalization In Jordan" Perihelion. Onl ine Journal of the European 
Rim Policy and Investment Counci l (ERPIC) February 2003 
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the King's program of economic reform and pro-Western globalization was the 
government's top priority, and this program was presented as part of a patriotic or 
nationalist agenda. 
Another example of liberalization making progress in the face of the harsh, anti­
democratic policies of King Abdullah's regime was in the field of women's rights. Since 
the coronation of King Abdullah II in 1999, the monarchy has been generally protective 
of women's organizations and has shown interest in working to improve the status of 
women in Jordan. While the Parliament was suspended between 2001 and 2003, the 
government took the opportunity to amend two bills related to women's rights. The first 
allowed women the right to file for divorce and the second gave the courts more leeway 
in imposing harsh punishments on those who commit honor crimes. The 1999 parliament 
had decided to retain impunity for those convicted of honor killings. The new House of 
Representatives rejected these amendments to the Civil Status Law and the Penal Code. 
According to the new law the age of marriage for men and women, which had been 16 
and 15, respectively, was raised to the age of 18. In addition, the children of Jordanian 
women and non-Jordanian men were now entitled to Jordanian citizenship. There had 
been little public demand for an emphasis on increased women's rights, yet King 
Abdullah unilaterally pushed forward many of these provisions, most likely to respond to 
what he perceived as western opinion of Jordanian society. Perhaps providing more civil 
liberties to women was a public relations move enacted in order to move Jordan closer to 
Western ideals and sensibilities. However, despite the motivation for the measures the 
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end result was increased protection and participation in civil society for Jordanian 
women. 
A third example of liberalization occurring under King Abdullah concerns the media. 
King Hussein had significantly cracked down on media criticism of the state and its 
policies after the 1993 elections, and Abdullah had followed his father's lead, often 
suppressing dissent and criticism of his policies. Members of the media also spoke of 
editorial censorship, fear of dismissal for reporting on contentious issues, and increased 
self-censorship. Jordan adopted new penal codes shortly after the September 11, 2001, 
attacks on the United States under the guise of combating terrorism. These new laws 
allowed the government to jail and fine journalists and close publications that committed 
a number of very broadly defined offenses. These powers have been widely abused by 
the state security.1 3 6 
However, King Abdullah promised a number of initiatives aimed at modernizing the 
local media. In 2001, he called for the abolition of the Ministry of Information, which 
regulated the media and enforced restrictions on the press. The ministry was eventually 
abolished in October 2003 and was replaced by the High Media Council, a twelve 
member supervisory body with an ambiguous mandate, including recommending media 
policy to the government. In December 2002, the King ordered the reformation of the 
High Media Council with the aim of making it more independent of executive control. 
Center for the Protection of Journalis ts (CPJ) . 
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In December 2003, the government created a new licensing system for private radio 
and television stations, ending the state's monopoly on broadcast media. Several laws 
have been enacted, modified, or abolished to detach state media organizations from direct 
government control through the establishment of independent boards to run them, 
including the Board of Directors of the Radio and Television Corporation. The 
government also sold its shares in the daily newspapers as an assurance of its 
determination to liberalize the sector. Laws have been passed to allow private TV and 
radio stations to operate in Jordan, with two such licenses already granted.1 3 7 Also, The 
Qatar-based satellite channel al-Jazeera banned in Jordan in 2002, was allowed to resume 
broadcasting in March 2003. 
Despite government intimidation and a history of censorship of the media Jordan has 
far more freedom of the press than most of its neighbors. Furthermore King Abdullah 
has repeatedly asserted his goal of achieving a free media within Jordanian society.1 5 8 
The motivation for this may also be to align Jordan more closely with its western allies 
but yet again the end result is a freer and more liberal society. Credit should be given to 
King Abdullah since these liberalizing reforms were enacted during the suspension of the 
democratically elected parliament. 
In June 2003, elections were finally held under yet another electoral law. The new 
law, announced in July 2001, lowered the age of voting eligibility for men and women 
from 19 to 18, and increased the number of parliamentary seats from 80 to 104, with new 
1 5 7
 h t tp : / /www.kingabduIlah. jo 
1 5 8
 Ibid. 
 t   
      
 ,       
t  t  t 
      
t    
   
ted. ls  
      
  
 t      
      
      ociety.IS8 
   
      
       
l   
t     
 ,      
      
157 http:// . l .  
158 Ibid. 
110 
(but still uneven) electoral districts. In February 2003, King Abdullah added to the 
changes with a new decree adding six more parliamentary seats in a specific quota to 
ensure minimal representation for women. Ironically, the IAF had originally opposed the 
women's quota, but then included a woman, Hayat al-Musayni, among its slate of thirty 
candidates. al-Musayni turned out to be the top vote-getter among women candidates 
overall. Thus in an ironic twist, the first woman seated in the new 2003-2007 parliament 
was a conservative Islamist activist. 1 5 9 The IAF succeeded in getting seventeen of its 
party members elected (including al-Musayni); aside from the IAF, five independent 
Islamists whom the IAF had expelled from its ranks just before the election were also 
elected. Most of the parliamentary seats, however, went to traditional tribal leaders or 
former government officials, and at least 62 seats out of one 110 went to loyalist 
proregime figures.1 6 0 Voter turnout stood at 59% of eligible voters, with few mishaps or 
irregularities, in spite of systematic gerrymandering. The king also required that all 
candidates be "independents" rather than party members. King Abdullah had learned his 
father's trick of ensuring a favorable government by manipulating the voting system. 
2007 Elections 
Elections for the Chamber of Deputies were held on November 20, 2007. Again, 
six seats were reserved for women, nine for Christians and three for other minority 
groups. The IAF again participated in the elections, running twenty-two candidates of 
1 5 9
 Ryan, "Political Opposition, Democracy And Jordan's 2003 Elections." 
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which only six were elected.1 6 'There were the usual accusations of voter fraud, vote 
buying and electoral manipulation intended to ensure that independent loyalists won. 
However, the IAF does not appear, at this time, willing to take any action more serious 
than calling for independent monitors. Therefore, the results seem likely to stand. 
It is interesting to note that out of 880 candidates running for 110 seats, 199 were 
women running for the six seats designated for women. 1 6 2 The IAF was also confronted 
with voter apathy, turnout was only around 54% and economic concerns were voter's 
primary interest rather than the social and political issues that dominate the IAF's 
platform. In the BBC article cited above, a disillusioned voter quoted by Associated 
Press said: "I'm not voting for anyone because they're all liars - Islamists and all the 
others. They just want to grab seats in parliament and will forget about us and our needs." 
This quote clearly demonstrates that the participation of the IAF in previous 
governments has managed to firmly associate it with the regime. It is the loyal 
opposition and is perceived by the Jordanian public as part of the problem and not the 
solution. Furthermore, the government was able to further marginalize the IAF by 
decreasing its participation in government from seventeen seats in Parliament to only six. 
By achieving this through a generally fair election process the government also increased 
its own legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. 
The Jordanian government has managed to incorporate the Muslim Brotherhood 
and other Islamists into the political system on its own terms. It provides the Islamists 
1 6 1
 "Large election losses for Jordanian Islamists" Al Jazeera, 22 November 2007. 
1 6 2
 "Jordan Holds Parlimentary Vote" BBC World News, 20 November 2007. 
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with limited access to a public forum which allows them to express their point of view to 
the community. Yet at the same time the government has so far ensured that the Islamists 
have never achieved any real level of power in the regime. This arrangement has led to 
peaceful cooperation between the government and Islamic fundamentalists that 
legitimizes both parties. In a sense, compromising with moderate fundamentalists while 
liberalizing the society has led to a more peaceful and more stable Jordan. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The principal Islamist movements in Egypt and Jordan are not preoccupied with 
the structure or form of government, and monarchy, democracy, socialism, etc. are 
irrelevant to them. Their primary concern is the moral and ethical behavior of the society 
through adherence to defined religious behavior. The Islamist interaction with the state 
can be characterized as more or less successful attempts to get the government to enact 
some sort of the Islamically-based legal code and promote Islamic norms of behavior. 
They wish to achieve this through a gradual transformation of society by means of social 
and educational programs and participation in the political process. However, when 
denied these avenues, or when threatened directly by the state, the Muslim Brotherhood 
has been willing to resort to violence. What has prevented it from becoming a full-blown 
militant Islamist organization seeking to overthrow the secular governments has been 
their limited local inclusion in social and political matters and their desire to explore 
those avenues first. 
In Egypt the Brotherhood has thrived in the social and political arena despite 
numerous government attempts to repress and dismantle it. Each attempt by the 
government to destroy the Brotherhood was met by stiff resistance. The government 
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never succeeded in silencing the Brotherhood or in eliminating the Islamist movement. In 
fact, repression seems to have had precisely the opposite effect, since government crack­
downs led to a radicalization of the organization and to violent conflict. Rather than 
establishing stability, the government created instability. Furthermore, the government 
lost credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of many who were sympathetic to the 
Brotherhood. Every attempt by various governments to control the opposition 
movements in Egypt led to less peace and less stability which was only rectified through 
a de-escalation of the tension and the reestablishment of limited participation by the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian society and politics. 
The experiences of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan are vastly different from 
those in Egypt. Since the Brotherhood in Jordan has entered into a symbiotic 
relationship with the state, stability was achieved and peace maintained through 
cooperation and tolerance between the government and the Brotherhood that provided 
both entities with legitimacy. Jordan is a unique case study which demonstrates how 
Islamist organizations and modern nation-states can cooperate and even participate in 
government institutions. This suggests a promising potential for the emergence of multi­
party systems of government and the acceptance of loyal opposition parties that include 
participation from the Islamist organizations in the wider Muslim world. Furthermore, the 
Jordanian government was able to enact liberalizing policies, including women's 
suffrage, that the Islamists opposed while they cooperated with them. 
Compared to the trials and the hardships faced by their counterparts in other 
Middle Eastern countries it appears that the Jordanian Brotherhood has found a happy 
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balance of state loyalty, democratic practice and Islamic principles. The Muslim 
Brotherhood in Jordan has occasionally objected publicly to government actions but has 
chosen to express itself in forms of public discourse rather than endorsing action against 
the government. The recent participation by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian 
elections suggests that other Islamists may be willing to explore the possibility of 
following the Jordanian model. 
These two case studies demonstrate that allowing limited participation in 
government and civil society is probably the most effective method of preventing Islamic 
fundamentalist organizations from radicalizing and adopting an extremist position that 
promotes rebellion against the state. Both the Egyptian and the Jordanian Muslim 
Brotherhood have demonstrated a willingness to play by the rules established by the 
government. Limited participation without harsh repressive measures on the part of the 
state provides Islamist groups with a platform from which they can express their views 
peacefully. Participation in the government apparatus gives the Islamists a vested interest 
in supporting the government, which promotes stability, encourages compromise and 
discourages radicalization. At the same time, this arrangement also creates a degree of 
legitimacy for the state. Furthermore, by associating the opposition with the system it 
provides a mechanism by which the state can marginalize the opposition, effectively 
making it part of the problem rather than an alternative solution, as demonstrated in 
Jordan. 
Finally, by allowing moderate, nonviolent Islamic fundamentalist organizations to 
exist, the state is providing a peaceful alternative to the violent, radicalized movements. 
 
      
 lf  
    
   
  
 
   tI     
t list     
    
   
    
  
.   
  
  
   
   eff t
     
. 
 t list 
 l  
116 
Though militant Islam will still hold an appeal for a small minority, many potential 
supporters can be siphoned off if they have a peaceful alternative avenue in which to 
express their fundamentalist, reformist views. Repression only fuels the popularity of 
violent movements. 
The government of Egypt's reaction to the Brotherhood seems entirely out of 
proportion. The government did not distinguish between the radical militant 
organizations and the moderate nonviolent movements. At times, the government 
appears to fear the influence and the successes of the nonviolent organization more than 
they fear the potential of a violent rebellion. The Muslim Brotherhood must gradually be 
folded into the political realm and perhaps be marginalized by being 'part of the problem' 
rather than the solution, much as Jordan has done. 
Ultimately, the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in a modern Arab state will have 
to be determined by those states. Both Egypt and Jordan have achieved political and 
social stability and both of their regimes are firmly entrenched. Now would be the time 
to move towards increasing fundamentalist inclusion in the government and society while 
it can be controlled and the message can be kept moderate. Yet, recent events in both 
Egypt and Jordan show the governments moving in the opposite direction. In response, 
the Muslim Brotherhood, in both countries, have retreated into more conservative and 
potentially more radical rhetoric. If they do not learn from their past experiences, Egypt 
risks a repeat of the cycle of suppression, repression and violence. Jordan risks moving 
backwards and losing that working relationship they have achieved with the Muslim 
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Brotherhood. That could only lead to destabilization of the country and the Hashemite 
regime. 
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